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This Article critically examines a cluster of rules that use the concept of prejudice
to restrict the scope of criminal defendants’ procedural rights, forming what I call
prejudice-based rights. I focus, in particular, on outcome-centric prejudicebased rights—rights that apply only when failing to apply them might cause
prejudice by aﬀecting the outcome of the case. Two of criminal defendants’ most
important rights fit this description: the right, originating in Brady v. Maryland, to
obtain favorable, “material” evidence within the government’s knowledge, and the
right to eﬀective assistance of counsel. Since prejudice (or equivalently, materiality)
is an element of these rights, no constitutional violation occurs when the government
suppresses favorable evidence, or defense counsel furnishes ineﬀective assistance,
unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome was aﬀected thereby.
Outcome-centric, right-restricting prejudice rules serve understandable functions:
they enable courts to preserve finality by rationing appellate and postconviction relief.
To the extent this is their aim, however, such rules sweep far too broadly. For they
narrow the scope of defendants’ rights not only in appellate and postconviction
proceedings, as intended, but also at the trial court level, where finality is not at stake.
The overbreadth of these rules is deeply problematic. For one thing, eﬀorts to predict
outcome-determinative prejudice ex ante usually amount to little more than
guesswork, since relevant information is in short supply during the early stages of a
prosecution. And in any event, procedural fairness is essential in every criminal
case—not just when fair processes are needed to prevent unfair outcomes. Outcomecentric prejudice-based rights are at odds with that premise, because the entitlements
they bestow vanish once a trial judge, prosecutor, or police oﬃcer determines that the
outcome is a foregone conclusion.
After fleshing out these concerns, I propose a two-pronged strategy for reforming
Brady, eﬀective assistance of counsel, and potentially other outcome-centric
prejudice-based rights. First, courts should remove prejudice from the definition of
these rights, treating prejudice instead as a remedial question—one that would come
into play when a convicted defendant seeks relief from an appellate or postconviction
court, but generally not in other settings. Second, courts should dismantle the
outcome-centric conception of prejudice embedded in these doctrines and replace it
with a non-outcome-centric framework that I call contextual harmless error
review. These reforms would greatly improve the fairness of the criminal process, and
would do so without unduly disturbing the finality of trial court judgments.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article critically examines a cluster of rules that use the concept of
prejudice to restrict the scope of criminal defendants’ procedural rights,
forming what I call prejudice-based rights.1 I focus, in particular, on outcomecentric prejudice-based rights—rights that apply only when failing to apply them
might cause prejudice by aﬀecting the outcome of the case. Two of criminal
procedure’s most important rights ﬁt this description.2 One of these rights,
originating in Brady v. Maryland,3 entitles the defendant to obtain favorable,
“material” evidence within the government’s knowledge, where material
denotes “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.”4 The second
is the right to eﬀective assistance of counsel, which protects defendants
against unreasonable acts or omissions by counsel if, but only if, those errors
See generally infra Section I.A (deﬁning key terms).
There are also a number of other outcome-centric prejudice-based rights in constitutional
criminal procedure, beyond the two mentioned here, which I will discuss as the Article progresses.
See infra subsection I.B.3.
3 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see also infra
subsection I.B.1.
1
2
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are prejudicial, meaning a “reasonable probability” that counsel’s deﬁcient
performance swayed the outcome.5
Outcome-centric, right-restricting prejudice rules serve understandable
functions. Among other things, they enable courts to preserve the ﬁnality of
criminal judgments by foreclosing appellate and postconviction relief in cases
where the outcome is not on the line.6 To the extent this is their aim, however,
such rules sweep far too broadly.7 For they narrow the scope of defendants’
rights not only in appellate and postconviction proceedings, as intended, but
also at the trial court level,8 where ﬁnality is not at stake and where judges
and other actors must decide in the ﬁrst instance what rights mean and how
to enforce them.9
The overbreadth of these rules is deeply problematic. For one thing,
eﬀorts to predict outcome-determinative prejudice ex ante usually amount to
little more than guesswork, since at that juncture, relevant information is in
short supply regarding each side’s theory of the case, the evidence, and other
factors that often contribute to case outcomes. These informational gaps, in
conjunction with other epistemic obstacles discussed later, make it all but
impossible for judges and, especially, prosecutors and police oﬃcers to
reliably administer outcome-centric prejudice-based rights during the early
stages of a criminal prosecution.10 And in any event, procedural fairness is
essential in every criminal case, not just when fair processes are needed to
prevent unfair outcomes. Outcome-centric prejudice-based rights are at odds
with that premise, because the entitlements they bestow vanish once a trial
judge, prosecutor, or police oﬃcer decides that the outcome is a foregone
conclusion.11 It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that Brady and the right to
eﬀective assistance of counsel are widely regarded as paper tigers—grand
symbols of our collective commitment to fairness, to be sure, but symbols that
have utterly failed in practice to make good on their respective promises.12
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also infra subsection I.B.2.
See infra Section I.C.
As we shall see, courts sometimes have multiple reasons—not just safeguarding ﬁnality—for
choosing outcome-centric, right-restricting prejudice rules. But ﬁnality is often a key factor,
especially for Brady and eﬀective assistance of counsel. See infra Section I.C.
8 When I refer to decisionmaking at the trial court level in this Article, I mean to include all
aspects of the criminal process that precede entry of judgment, ranging from plea negotiations and
discovery to trial and sentencing.
9 See infra Section II.A.
10 See infra subsection II.B.1.
11 See infra subsection II.B.2.
12 As to Brady, see, for example, Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S.
TEX. L. REV. 685, 728 (2006) (“[M]ore than any other rule of criminal procedure, the Brady rule has
been the most fertile and widespread source of misconduct by prosecutors; and, more than any other
rule of constitutional criminal procedure, has exposed the deﬁciencies in the truth-serving function
of the criminal trial.”). As to eﬀective assistance of counsel, see, for example, Paul Butler, Poor People
5
6
7

2020]

Prejudice-Based Rights

281

The array of problems that outcome-centric, right-restricting prejudice
rules cause at the trial court level are not yet well understood.13 This Article
surfaces those problems, then proposes a two-pronged strategy for reforming
Brady, eﬀective assistance of counsel, and potentially other outcome-centric
prejudice-based rights.14 First, courts should remove prejudice from the
deﬁnition of these rights, treating prejudice instead as a remedial question—
one that would come into play when a convicted defendant seeks relief from
an appellate or postconviction court, but generally not in other settings.15
Second, courts should dismantle the outcome-centric conception of prejudice
embedded in these doctrines, and replace it with a non-outcome-centric
framework that I call contextual harmless error review.16 These reforms would
greatly improve the fairness of the criminal process, and would do so without
unduly disturbing the ﬁnality of trial court judgments.
The Article has three Parts. Part I deﬁnes core concepts such as prejudice
and prejudice-based rights, and then introduces the various doctrinal areas in
Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2190-91 (2013) (arguing that the right to
state-appointed counsel “has been a spectacular failure” partly because “[i]ndigent defense has been
grossly underfunded, where it is provided at all”).
13 In fact, much of the existing academic literature suggests there is little or no practical
diﬀerence between right-restricting prejudice rules, on one hand, and harmless error rules, which
limit access to appellate and postconviction relief but generally do not apply at the trial court level.
See infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. One scholar recently argued, for instance, that using
prejudice to deﬁne rights is “functionally indistinguishable” from subjecting rights to harmless error
review on appeal. Daniel Epps, Harmless Errors and Substantial Rights, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2117, 2162
(2018); see also id. at 2158-64 (contending that harmless error rules are best understood as relating to
rights, not remedies). This Article challenges that view. See infra Part II. While it certainly is true
that outcome-centric, right-restricting prejudice rules function similarly to harmless error rules
when administered by appellate and postconviction courts, right-restricting prejudice rules (unlike
harmless error rules) are also routinely applied during earlier stages of the criminal process by trial
judges and, in some instances, by prosecutors and police oﬃcers. One core aim of this Article is to
show why this diﬀerence matters and, relatedly, why we should generally prefer some version of
harmless error review over outcome-centric, right-restricting prejudice rules.
14 I say potentially because Brady and eﬀective assistance of counsel serve as my principal case
studies throughout the Article. It could be that there are stronger reasons for maintaining the status
quo in other doctrinal domains than there are for Brady and eﬀective assistance. Even so, the larger
themes the Article explores—regarding the diﬃculty of measuring outcome-determinative prejudice
(especially ex ante) and the importance of non-truth-furthering interests in criminal procedure—
have relevance far beyond the conﬁnes of Brady and eﬀective assistance jurisprudence.
15 See infra Section III.A.
16 See infra Section III.B. The concept of contextual harmless error review is not entirely new:
it is an idea I previously developed, for use in connection with errors involving non-prejudice-based
rights, in a recent article. See Justin Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1791 (2017) (proposing a “contextual approach to harmless error review” that
“would assess harm in relation to the constellation of interests served by the particular procedural
rule that was infringed and would not, as under existing law, automatically conﬁne the harmless
error inquiry to estimating the error’s eﬀect on the outcome”). That article did not consider whether
a similar framework should be used in connection with prejudice-based rights like Brady and
eﬀective assistance of counsel. I take up that question in Section III.B of this Article.
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which courts have woven outcome-determinative prejudice into the fabric of
criminal defendants’ constitutional rights. Part II states my critique of
outcome-centric, right-restricting prejudice rules. And Part III advances my
proposal for reform.
I. THE LAW OF PREJUDICE-BASED RIGHTS
This Part introduces the law of prejudice-based rights. I begin by laying
the deﬁnitional groundwork for what follows. To summarize, (1) prejudice
refers here to harm, not discrimination; (2) outcome-centric prejudice rules are
rules that treat an adverse outcome as the only recognizable kind of harm;
and (3) prejudice-based rights are rights that apply only when failing to apply
them might cause prejudice. The critique developed later in this Article is
targeted primarily at outcome-centric prejudice-based rights. After a preliminary
exposition of these concepts, I then discuss Brady and the right to eﬀective
assistance of counsel—which are my principal case studies throughout the
Article—as well as other areas of criminal procedure in which the Supreme
Court has incorporated outcome-centric prejudice requirements into the
deﬁnition of constitutional rights. And ﬁnally, I examine the reasons the
Court has articulated to justify outcome-centric, right-restricting prejudice
rules, focusing on the Court’s suggestion that such rules are needed to strike
a balance between procedural fairness to the defendant and the ﬁnality of
criminal judgments.
A. Prejudice and Prejudice-Based Rights Defined
Judge Learned Hand once wrote that “[o]ur procedure has been always
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted,” which impels judges to
be overly solicitous of criminal defendants and their rights.17 But criminal
procedure is also haunted by a second fear that pushes law in the opposite
direction: a fear that “the exaltation of [procedural] technicalities” will set the
guilty free.18 Courts have addressed this concern in a variety of ways. One
prominent strategy—not coincidentally, a strategy that Judge Hand deployed
aggressively—involves restricting defendants’ prerogative to complain about
nonprejudicial events in the criminal process.19

United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
E.g., John H. Wigmore, New Trials for Erroneous Rulings upon Evidence; A Practical Problem
for American Justice, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 444-45 (1903) (“[T]he constitutional safeguards of
procedure and evidence are invoked with such fatuous frequency and such misplaced technicality
that their respect is lowered and their true purposes are defeated.”).
19 See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 457 (2d ed. 2010)
(discussing a “recurrent dispute between [Judge Jerome] Frank and all the other [Second Circuit]
17
18
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What criteria do courts use to ascertain whether a procedural event is
nonprejudicial? And if it is nonprejudicial, does that mean the event does not
violate the defendant’s rights? Or does it mean, instead, that although the
defendant’s rights were violated, the violation is not important enough to
justify certain judicial remedies? Criminal procedure doctrine oﬀers a range
of disparate answers to each of these questions.
One area of inconsistency has to do with how the law deﬁnes prejudice.
Even narrowing the relevant universe of prejudice rules to those dealing with
“harm or injury”20 as opposed to bias21—a largely unrelated type of prejudice
that I do not cover here—the idea of harm is hardly self-deﬁning. For our
purposes, the key point is that some prejudice rules adopt an outcome-centric
metric of harm, whereas others do not. Outcome-centric rules measure harm
solely by asking whether a procedural event will aﬀect, or already has aﬀected,
the outcome.22 To illustrate, the test for prejudice in the Brady context is “a
reasonable probability that, had the [favorable] evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.”23 On the
other hand, non-outcome-centric rules deﬁne harm more expansively to include
both the risk of an adverse outcome as well as injury to other interests. Sixth
Amendment speedy trial doctrine, for example, assesses prejudice by
reference to all three “interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was
designed to protect,” which are “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii)
to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.”24
Prejudice rules also diﬀer from one another concerning where they ﬁt
within criminal procedure’s right/remedy divide. Some restrict the scope of
procedural rights, producing what I call prejudice-based rights: rights that apply
only when failing to apply them would cause prejudice. To mention just one
example (with more soon to follow25), the Supreme Court has indicated that
the right to eﬀective assistance of counsel is violated by deﬁcient
representation only if the deﬁciency results in prejudice.26 By contrast, other
judges,” including Judge Hand, concerning Judge Frank’s “great reluctance to view any trial error as
‘harmless’” and his corresponding “solicitude for criminal defendants’ claims”).
20 Prejudice, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 1388 (2d rev. ed. 2005) (“Harm or injury that
results or may result from some action or judgement.”) (second deﬁnition).
21 See id. (“Preconceived opinion that is not based on reason or actual experience.”) (first definition).
22 See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, Tests for Harm in Criminal Cases: A Fix for Blurred Lines, 17
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 991, 997-1012 (2015).
23 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see also infra
note 44 and accompanying text.
24 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
25 See infra Section I.B.
26 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984); see also infra notes 57–64 and
accompanying text.
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prejudice rules are remedial in nature.27 They cut oﬀ access to certain
remedies for nonprejudicial violations of procedural rights, yet they do so
without incorporating prejudice into the deﬁnition of the aﬀected rights. The
harmless error doctrine is paradigmatic. Generally speaking, it prohibits
reversal of a criminal conviction or sentence based on violations of
defendants’ rights that caused no prejudice.28 But a harmless error is “still an
error”29—that is, a violation of the defendant’s rights—despite the absence of
prejudice, since harmless error review classiﬁes prejudice as a limit on
remedies rather than rights.30
This taxonomy clariﬁes the parameters of my thesis. The concerns that
animate this Article have to do, not with prejudice as such, but with a
uniquely combustible mix of the ingredients described earlier. My critique,
which I spell out in Part II, is directed primarily at prejudice rules that (1)
deﬁne prejudice by reference to outcomes and (2) restrict rights, not just
remedies, thus forming outcome-centric prejudice-based rights.

27 I use the term remedy in the same sense as Doug Laycock, who has said that remedies are
concerned with “what to do about a completed or threatened violation of law,” a question that is
“distinct from . . . whether there has been or is about to be a violation.” Douglas Laycock, How
Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 164-65 (2008).
28 The harmless error test for constitutional errors reviewed on direct appeal, for instance, asks
whether the prosecution can “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute
to the verdict.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). By contrast, when constitutional
errors are reviewed in a federal postconviction proceeding, the test is “whether the error ‘had
substantial and injurious eﬀect or inﬂuence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
For a helpful summary of these and other variants of the harmless error doctrine as it relates to
constitutional errors, see John M. Greabe, The Riddle of Harmless Error Revisited, 54 HOUS. L. REV.
59, 71-79 (2016).
29 E.g., State v. Cullen, 39 S.W.3d 899, 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (“[I]t is still error—albeit
‘harmless’ error—for a trial court to allow proof of a defendant’s prior or persistent oﬀender status
after submission of the case to the jury.”).
30 This, at any rate, is the conventional way to understand the harmless error doctrine. See, e.g.,
Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1994) (stating
that harmless error “is best viewed as a question of the law of remedies” because it deals with
“whether a particular form of relief—the reversal of a conviction or the vacation of a judgment—
should be available to redress the past wrong” (latter quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1770
(1991))). Dan Epps has recently staked out a contrary position, arguing that “harmless error analysis
is best understood as an inquiry about constitutional rights, not remedies” because subjecting
violations of a right to harmless error review is “functionally indistinguishable” from making
prejudice part of the right. Epps, supra note 13, at 2122, 2162. Here, I think the conventional wisdom
is essentially correct. The key premise supporting Epps’s revisionist account—that right-restricting
prejudice rules and harmless error rules are “functionally indistinguishable,” id. at 2162—is mistaken
for reasons I explore below. See infra Part II.
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B. Prejudice-Based Rights in Constitutional Doctrine
A number of core constitutional protections, most notably Brady and
eﬀective assistance of counsel, qualify as outcome-centric prejudice-based
rights under current Supreme Court precedent. This Section describes these
rights and their associated prejudice requirements.
1. Brady
The scope of criminal discovery is and long has been remarkably narrow
in many U.S. jurisdictions, especially when compared with the norm in civil
litigation.31 Constitutional doctrine has by and large sought to avoid
disrupting America’s venerable tradition of trial by ambush.32 The most
important exception to this pattern is the Brady rule, which obligates the
government to disclose evidence within its knowledge that is both favorable
and material to the defense.
In Brady, the Supreme Court considered whether a new trial was required
because the prosecutor had suppressed an accomplice’s confession that was
relevant to the capital trial’s penalty phase.33 The Court held that the
defendant was entitled to a new trial as to the penalty phase (where the
suppressed evidence might have mattered), but not as to the guilt phase
(where, according to the Court, the evidence would have been
inadmissible).34 In reaching that conclusion, the Court announced the
following rule: “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an

31 “Historically, discovery was unavailable in either civil or criminal cases, and, despite the full
development of discovery in civil cases, denial in criminal cases . . . persisted” until well into the
twentieth century. Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV.
293, 294 (1960). Today, criminal discovery practices are “remarkably diverse across 50 state
jurisdictions and the federal courts.” Darryl K. Brown, Discovery, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 147, 148 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). Fifteen states and the federal government follow “the
narrowest approach,” which “require[s] very little” disclosure in a number of crucial categories, id.
at 155, whereas six states embrace “very broad discovery,” id., while the rest follow various
“intermediate” options, id. at 156.
32 According to the Supreme Court, “[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in
a criminal case,” and “the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery
which the parties must be aﬀorded . . . .” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 562 (1977) (latter
quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)).
33 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84-85 (1963). At trial, John Brady admitted participating
in the charged murder but argued to the jury that he should not receive the death penalty since his
companion, Boblit, was the one who actually killed the victim. Id. at 84. Before trial, Brady’s lawyer
had asked the prosecution to let him examine Boblit’s out-of-court statements. Id. The prosecution
complied in part, but suppressed one statement in which Boblit “admitted the actual homicide.” Id.
34 See id. at 88-90.
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accused upon request[35] violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment.”36
Brady did not specify what makes evidence “material” to the defense.37
Was the Court referring to materiality in the expansive evidentiary sense of
the term? Or did the Court envision some sort of prejudice requirement?
Brady did not supply a clear answer to that question.38 Nor did Brady shed
much light on whether materiality represents a limit on the defendant’s
constitutional rights, or remedies—speciﬁcally, the remedy of a new trial.39
The Court’s later decision in United States v. Bagley resolved the ﬁrst set
of questions (what does materiality mean?) and commented on—without
deﬁnitively resolving—the second (does materiality have to do with rights or
remedies?).40 Bagley came to the Supreme Court by way of the Ninth Circuit,
which had required “automatic reversal” in cases where the prosecution
suppressed impeachment information that the defense had requested before
trial and needed for “eﬀective cross-examination.”41 All nine justices spurned
this automatic reversal rule, but divided over other aspects of the case.42
35 Although Brady’s holding was arguably conﬁned to cases where the defense had “request[ed]”
the suppressed evidence, id. at 87, later cases dispensed with any such requirement. See generally
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 5.3 (2d ed. 2001).
36 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Court cast this rule as “an extension” of Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935) (per curiam), and its progeny. Id. at 86; cf. infra note 83 (discussing the Mooney doctrine).
37 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
38 Compare United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 703 n.5 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“Brady might have used the word [material] in its evidentiary sense, to mean, essentially, germane
to the points at issue.”), with United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“[I]mplicit in the
requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have aﬀected the
outcome of the trial.”).
39 Viewed in isolation, the canonical formulation of Brady’s holding, quoted above in full,
appears to suggest that materiality is among the elements that determine when suppression violates
due process—or simply put, that materiality goes to rights, not remedies. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87
(stating that suppression “violates due process” where, among other things, “the evidence is
material”). But elsewhere in Brady, the Court summed up the content of its newly minted
constitutional rule without any mention of materiality. See, e.g., id. at 86-87 (approving a Third
Circuit case that had “state[d] the correct constitutional rule,” and citing that case for the proposition
that “the ‘suppression of evidence favorable’ to the accused was itself suﬃcient to amount to a denial
of due process” (quoting United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 820 (3d Cir. 1952))).
40 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). For a guide to the main developments in Brady doctrine during
the two decades between Brady itself and Bagley, see Barbara Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence
Favorable to an Accused and Eﬀective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1143-55, 1175-82
(1982). The most important of these intervening developments relates to Agurs, a case discussed in
Section I.C, infra notes 91–99.
41 Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983) (latter quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308, 318 (1974)).
42 Even the dissenters would have held, contrary to the Ninth Circuit, that some kind of
prejudice analysis—and not automatic reversal—should apply to Brady claims asserted on appeal or
postconviction review, including for claims based on evidence the defense had requested and the
prosecution nevertheless suppressed. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 696 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Brady violations should be subject to harmless error review under Chapman v. California, 386
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Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court held that the suppression of
evidence requires reversal “only if the evidence is material in the sense that
its suppression undermines conﬁdence in the outcome of the trial.”43 And ﬁve
justices, writing in two separate opinions, indicated that evidence is material
if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.”44
Bagley thus answered the question of what prejudice means (or more
precisely, what materiality means) for purposes of the Brady doctrine.45
Moreover, passages in Bagley46 and subsequent decisions47 strongly suggest
that the Court’s outcome-centric “reasonable probability”48 test for prejudice
determines the scope of the defendant’s due process right, not just whether a
violation of that right warrants the remedy of a new trial. Some academics,
to be sure, have forcefully made the case that those passages should be
discounted as dicta.49 And a number of lower courts have embraced the idea
that Bagley’s materiality standard solely restricts access to the remedy of a
new trial, without aﬀecting the shape of the underlying due process right.50
As a normative matter, I agree with that result, for reasons developed later

U.S. 18 (1967)); id. at 709-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that in suppression cases involving
either “knowing use of perjured testimony” by the prosecution, or favorable evidence “speciﬁcally
requested by the defendant,” reviewing courts should reverse if “there was ‘any reasonable likelihood’
that [the evidence] ‘could have aﬀected’ the outcome of the trial” (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103),
but that a less defense-friendly prejudice test should apply if “there had been neither perjury nor a
speciﬁc [defense] request”).
43 Id. at 678.
44 Id. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J.); accord id. at 685 (White, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.). The Court cribbed
this “reasonable probability” standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
landmark case on ineﬀective assistance that the Court had decided a year earlier. See Bagley, 473 U.S.
at 682, 685; cf. infra subsection I.B.2 (discussing Strickland).
45 See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017) (reiterating that “material”
means “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding
would have been diﬀerent” (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2009)).
46 See, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674 (“The holding in Brady . . . requires disclosure only of
evidence that is both favorable to the accused and ‘material either to guilt or to punishment.’”
(quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (1963))).
47 Most revealingly, one case states that “[a] ‘Brady violation’ is sometimes used to refer to any breach
of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence . . . although . . . there is never a real ‘Brady
violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed
evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
48 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
49 See Janet C. Hoeﬀel & Stephen I. Singer, Activating a Brady Pretrial Duty to Disclose Favorable
Information: From the Mouths of Supreme Court Justices to Practice, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
467, 469-73 (2014). For a contrary view, see generally Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady
Doctrine, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 415 (2011).
50 Many other courts disagree, resulting in a split discussed later. See infra notes 120–31 and
accompanying text.
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on.51 But as a descriptive matter, the dominant understanding of Brady—
shared by many lower courts and well grounded in the language if not,
perhaps, the holdings of the Supreme Court’s foundational precedents—
conceptualizes materiality as a core ingredient that deﬁnes the outer
boundaries of the defendant’s disclosure rights.52
2. Eﬀective Assistance of Counsel
“Of all of the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented
by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it aﬀects his ability to assert any
other rights he may have.”53 Without the aid of a trained advocate, many
defendants—whether innocent or otherwise—would be ill equipped to
negotiate pleas on a level playing ﬁeld with the prosecutor, litigate
meritorious procedural claims, test the government’s proof at trial, or make
the case for a reasonable sentence. Representation by counsel is often
indispensable for attaining these goals. Yet more is needed than “mere formal
appointment” of an attorney, or else the safeguards ﬂowing from the right to
counsel would be illusory.54 The right to counsel has thus come to mean a
“right to the eﬀective assistance of counsel.”55
The landmark case concerning the Sixth Amendment’s eﬀective assistance
doctrine is Strickland v. Washington.56 Strickland held that to prove ineﬀective
assistance after conviction, the defendant must show both that counsel
performed deﬁciently and that the deﬁcient performance resulted in
prejudice.57 The Court acknowledged that for certain kinds of ineﬀective

See infra Section III.A.
See infra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956);
accord United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984). Justice Schaefer’s widely quoted claim,
however, is subject to a rather glaring caveat. Under current constitutional doctrine, the right to
counsel does not apply in misdemeanor prosecutions that do not lead to imprisonment. See Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); cf. John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 49 (2013) (criticizing Scott and calling for the Court to
extend the right to counsel “to all criminal cases”).
54 See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (“The Constitution’s guarantee of assistance
of counsel cannot be satisﬁed by mere formal appointment.”).
55 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
56 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The law on eﬀective assistance of counsel began to take shape long
before Strickland. See generally Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads,
New Paths—A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 65-73 (1986).
57 466 U.S. at 687. The defendant, David Leroy Washington, challenged his death sentence on
the theory that his court-appointed lawyer failed to investigate or present evidence about his
precarious mental condition and his good character. See id. at 672, 675-76. The Court deemed
Washington’s claim “a double failure,” as he could not prove “either deﬁcient performance or
suﬃcient prejudice.” Id. at 700.
51
52
53
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assistance, “prejudice is presumed.”58 But such cases represent rare exceptions
to the “general requirement that the defendant aﬃrmatively prove
prejudice.”59 And to satisfy that requirement, the defendant ordinarily60 has
to establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.”61
Does Strickland’s prejudice requirement belong to the jurisprudence of
Sixth Amendment rights, or remedies? Put diﬀerently, is prejudice a deﬁning
component of the right to eﬀective assistance of counsel, or a remedial issue
for reviewing courts to sort out when deciding whether a violation of that
right warrants setting aside a trial court judgment? Neither Strickland nor the
Supreme Court’s other ineﬀective assistance cases have squarely addressed
this question. And lower courts have reached conﬂicting conclusions, much
as they have in deciding whether Brady’s materiality requirement pertains to
rights or remedies.62 But Strickland’s reasoning (parts of it, anyway63) strongly
suggests that prejudice is an element of the underlying constitutional right,
not just a remedial question, and the Court has echoed that suggestion in
many of its post-Strickland decisions.64
58 Id. at 692; see generally JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL 186-88 (2002). There is a presumption of prejudice, according to Strickland, for Sixth
Amendment claims alleging “[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether”
as well as “various kinds of state interference with counsel’s assistance.” 466 U.S. at 692 (latter citing
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 & n.25). Strickland also mentioned “a similar, though more limited,
presumption of prejudice” where the defendant can show “that counsel ‘actively represented
conﬂicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conﬂict of interest adversely aﬀected [the] lawyer’s
performance.’” Id. at 692 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980)).
59 Id. at 693.
60 Some of the Court’s ineﬀective assistance cases require proof of prejudice while modifying
certain features of Strickland’s test. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (holding that,
where counsel’s ineﬀective advice allegedly prompted the defendant to plead guilty, the appropriate
prejudice inquiry is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the
defendant] . . . would have insisted on going to trial”).
61 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
62 See infra notes 153–71, 293–95 and accompanying text.
63 Consider, for instance, Strickland’s claim that a prejudice requirement is implicit in the
“purpose” of the right to counsel itself and that, therefore, attorney errors “must be prejudicial to
the defense in order to constitute ineﬀective assistance under the Constitution.” 466 U.S. at 691-92.
By contrast, other parts of the Strickland opinion—including the question presented as stated in the
opinion’s opening sentence—imply that the Court’s holding might be restricted to its
(postconviction) remedial context. See id. at 671 (noting that “[t]his case requires us to consider the
proper standards for judging . . . [whether] the Constitution requires a conviction or death sentence to
be set aside because counsel’s assistance at the trial or sentencing was ineﬀective.” (emphasis added));
see also infra notes 86–90 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s emphasis on remedy-speciﬁc
concerns relating to the ﬁnality of criminal judgments in Strickland).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (“Counsel cannot be
‘ineﬀective’ unless his mistakes have harmed the defense (or, at least, unless it is reasonably likely
that they have). Thus, a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to eﬀective representation is not
‘complete’ until the defendant is prejudiced.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685)).

290

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 277

3. Additional Illustrations
In addition to Brady and effective assistance of counsel, a number of other
constitutional rights also contain outcome-centric prejudice requirements
according to the Supreme Court’s precedents.65 These rights mostly fall within
one or both of two categories—categories that include Brady but are not
limited to it. The first is “what might loosely be called the area of
constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence,”66 and the second encompasses
much of what the Constitution has to say about prosecutorial misconduct at
trial. I offer only a cursory sketch of each category here—just enough to reveal
the range of constitutional doctrines potentially implicated by the critique of
outcome-centric prejudice-based rights that I develop later in the Article.
The ﬁeld of “constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence”67 is home to
an especially dense concentration of outcome-centric prejudice-based
rights.68 One set of decisions, originating in United States v. Marion,69 grants
limited protection against pre-accusation delay so as to minimize the loss of
potential defense evidence.70 This right, however, is violated only when the
delay results in “actual prejudice,”71 which many lower courts plausibly take
to mean some likelihood that the delay aﬀected or will aﬀect the outcome.72
Building on Marion, Brady, and related cases, United States v. ValenzuelaBernal held that deportation of potential defense witnesses would violate due
process and compulsory process “only if there is a reasonable likelihood” that
65 The list of such rights would grow longer still if we were to consider issues percolating in
the lower courts. For example, courts appear divided over “whether the [constitutional] right to
present relevant, material evidence in one’s own defense is conditioned on a showing that such
evidence is likely to aﬀect the outcome of the trial.” Brief for National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Heath v. United States, 571 U.S. 1125
(2014) (No. 12-11003), 2013 WL 3895248. But see Brief for United States in Opposition at 19-23,
Heath, 571 U.S. 1125 (on ﬁle with author).
66 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982).
67 Id.
68 See generally 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.3(a) (4th ed. 2015).
The smorgasbord of constitutional rights that ﬁt this rubric derive from due process, the Sixth
Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause, or both, and their doctrinal tests generally “focus[] on
the totality of the circumstances and weigh[] such factors as . . . the likelihood of prejudicial impact
on the outcome of the particular case.” Id.
69 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
70 See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977) (discussing due process limitations
that “protect[] against oppressive delay” (citing Marion, 404 U.S. 307)). This due process right is
distinct from, and somewhat less protective than, the more familiar Sixth Amendment speedy trial
right applicable to post-accusation delay. See generally Phyllis Goldfarb, When Judges Abandon
Analogy: The Problem of Delay in Commencing Criminal Prosecutions, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 607,
610 (1990).
71 Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789; see also id. at 790 (“[P]roof of prejudice is generally a necessary but
not suﬃcient element of a due process claim . . . .”).
72 See, e.g., Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1996).
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the witnesses’ testimony could sway the outcome.73 And California v.
Trombetta74 and Arizona v. Youngblood75 established modest limits on the
government’s prerogative to destroy or fail to preserve potential defense
evidence if that evidence meets a “standard of constitutional materiality”
derived largely from Brady law.76
Constitutional rights relating to prosecutorial misconduct at trial are also
typically tied to a risk of outcome-determinative prejudice. The foundational
case in this area is Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, which held that improper
prosecutorial remarks during argument to the jury violate due process only
when “such remarks, in the context of the entire trial, were suﬃciently
prejudicial.”77 Later cases have applied the Donnelly standard to numerous
other forms of prosecutorial misconduct (and beyond),78 and clariﬁed that its
test for prejudice has an outcome-centric ﬂavor.79 To be sure, the Donnelly line
of cases does not exhaust the ﬁeld of constitutional regulation—let alone
nonconstitutional regulation80—for prosecutorial misconduct. Misconduct that
violates enumerated rights, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, is
deﬁned without reference to prejudice (though it is subject to harmless error
review on appeal).81 The same is also true of a few due process-based
constraints on misconduct, such as the rules announced in Doyle v. Ohio82 and,
458 U.S. 858, 873-74 (1982).
467 U.S. 479 (1984).
488 U.S. 51 (1988).
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489; see id. at 488 & n.8 (stating that “[w]hatever duty the
Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that
might be expected to play a signiﬁcant role in the suspect’s defense,” and comparing this restriction
to the Brady doctrine’s “similar requirement of materiality”); see also Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*
(applying “the standard of constitutional materiality in Trombetta”).
77 416 U.S. 637, 639 (1974); see also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765-67 (1987); Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180-84 (1986).
78 See, e.g., Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410 (1989) (citing Donnelly for the proposition that
the defendant “could have challenged the improper remarks by the trial judge at the time of his trial
as a violation of due process” (emphasis added)).
79 See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-67 & n.7. Greer held that the improper prosecutorial argument at
issue there did not prejudice the defendant under the Donnelly standard, relying in part on the lower
court’s conclusion that, under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), “the prosecutor’s question
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 765. The Court reasoned in part that Chapman’s
outcome-centric prejudice standard “is more demanding [from the prosecution’s standpoint] than
the ‘fundamental fairness’ inquiry of the Due Process Clause,” making it “clear” that the district
court—having found the impropriety harmless even under Chapman—“also would have found no
due process violation” under Donnelly. Id. at 765 n.7.
80 See generally GERSHMAN, supra note 35, § 14.
81 See, e.g., Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19-20, 25-26 (applying harmless error review where the
prosecutor commented on the defendants’ choice not to testify in violation of the Fifth Amendment
as construed by Griﬃn v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)).
82 See 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (holding that due process is violated where a prosecutor impeaches
a testifying defendant using the defendant’s silence after being arrested and Mirandized); see also Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) (applying harmless error review to Doyle errors).
73
74
75
76
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more debatably, Mooney v. Holohan.83 But for the most part, current precedent
makes prejudice an element of constitutional claims alleging prosecutorial
misconduct connected with the trial process.
C. Finality and Fairness in the Balance
The cases reviewed in the previous Section fail to articulate a clear
rationale for hardwiring outcome-centric prejudice into the structure of
procedural rights. Indeed, those cases rarely even acknowledge the possibility
that prejudice might be operationalized in a non-outcome-centric fashion.84
Nor do they carefully consider whether prejudice should limit rights rather
than remedies. The case law does, however, shed some indirect light on the
thinking behind the Supreme Court’s outcome-centric, right-restricting
prejudice rules. The Court’s foundational decisions in this area often
emphasize the need to strike a balance between preventing the wrongful
conviction of innocent defendants and promoting countervailing state
interests such as the interest in restricting appellate and postconviction
review so as to preserve the ﬁnality of criminal convictions and sentences.85
83 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam). Mooney has come to stand for the proposition that “a
conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State,
must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment” and that “[t]he same result obtains when the State,
although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). Outcome-centric prejudice is needed to obtain reversal under Mooney:
speciﬁcally, there must be a “reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have aﬀected the
judgment of the jury.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citing, among other cases,
Napue, 360 U.S. at 271). What is less clear is whether this “reasonable likelihood” requirement
determines when due process is violated or merely when such a violation warrants setting aside a
judgment. Cf. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679-80 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)
(“Although [the Mooney/Napue] rule is stated in terms that treat the knowing use of perjured
testimony as error subject to harmless-error review, it may as easily be stated as a materiality
standard under which the fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure to
disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (footnote omitted)).
84 Strickland represents a partial exception to this pattern of neglect, since the Court considered
and rejected the defendant’s argument that a non-outcome-centric prejudice test—which would ask
whether counsel’s errors “impaired the presentation of the defense”—should apply to ineﬀective
assistance claims predicated on speciﬁc attorney errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693
(1984); see also infra note 87 and accompanying text.
85 The Supreme Court’s preoccupation with ﬁnality in these decisions may seem strange to a
modern observer. After all, the Court’s earlier decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
had already provided courts with one powerful tool—harmless error review—to shield the ﬁnality
of criminal judgments against nonprejudicial constitutional errors. See supra notes 28–30 and
accompanying text. The Court has never told us why harmless error review under Chapman is
suﬃcient to safeguard ﬁnality with respect to most kinds of constitutional error, but insuﬃcient in
relation to Brady, eﬀective assistance, and a handful of other constitutional rights. A key part of the
explanation, it seems to me, has to do with the fact that Brady and eﬀective assistance claims
ordinarily depend on belatedly revealed facts outside the trial court record. As a result, such claims
must often be resolved through a habeas proceeding or other postconviction review mechanism—
disfavored avenues in which “a presumption of ﬁnality and legality attaches to the conviction and
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Strickland is illustrative. In the section of the opinion announcing the
eﬀective assistance doctrine’s prejudice requirement, the Court began by
stating that an attorney error “does not warrant setting aside the judgment of
a criminal proceeding if the error had no eﬀect on the judgment.”86 Echoing
this theme, the Court went on to reject the defendant’s proposed test for
prejudice (whether counsel’s errors “impaired the presentation of the
defense”) because that test could not clarify which attorney errors “are
suﬃciently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding.”87
The Court then lauded the “strengths” of the prejudice standard advanced by
the United States as amicus (whether attorney errors “more likely than not
altered the outcome”), emphasizing that it “reﬂects the profound importance
of ﬁnality in criminal proceedings.”88 Yet the Court determined that the
United States’ standard was “not quite appropriate” because “[a]n ineﬀective
assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the
result . . . is reliable,” and thus “ﬁnality concerns are somewhat weaker and
the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower.”89
Ultimately, the Court struck a somewhat diﬀerent balance between reliability

sentence”—rather than on direct appeal. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 887 (1983)). Perhaps, then, the Court was concerned that Chapman’s perceivedly defensefriendly harmless error rule, though suitable for constitutional claims that tend to arise on direct
appeal, was inappropriate for claims that frequently necessitate postconviction review. Cf. id. at 636
(“[W]e think the costs of applying the Chapman standard on federal habeas outweigh the additional
deterrent eﬀect, if any, that would be derived from its application on collateral review.”). And since
the Court had not yet held—as it later would in Brecht—that a diﬀerent, relatively prosecutionfriendly harmless error standard applies on postconviction review than on direct appeal, the Court
may have folded prejudice into the deﬁnition of Brady, eﬀective assistance, and certain other rights
as a means of circumventing Chapman.
86 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1981)).
Revealingly, the Morrison case that Strickland cites here for support defends the need for prejudice
analysis on remedial grounds. The court of appeals had held that “the appropriate remedy” for the
underlying right to counsel violation was dismissal of the indictment with prejudice. Morrison, 449
U.S. at 363. The Supreme Court assumed without deciding that a Sixth Amendment violation had
occurred and reversed the appeals court’s remedial ruling due to lack of prejudice. Id. at 363-64. For
the sake of “preserving society’s interest in the administration of criminal justice,” the Court
concluded that unless the right to counsel error had an “impact on the criminal proceeding, . . . there
is no basis for imposing a remedy in that proceeding . . . .” Id. at 364-65.
87 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (quoting the respondent’s brief). The Court also cited pragmatic
concerns related to after-the-fact review to explain why a “presumption of prejudice” is inappropriate
for ineffective assistance claims stemming from attorney errors. Id. at 692-93; cf. supra note 58
(discussing other aspects of the right to counsel for which prejudice is presumed). The Court explained
in part that a presumption of prejudice “is reasonable for the criminal justice system” when
“impairments of the Sixth Amendment . . . are easy to identify and . . . easy for the government to
prevent” but that “[t]he government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney
errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-93.
88 Id. at 693.
89 Id. at 694.
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and ﬁnality by holding that “the appropriate test for prejudice” asks whether
there is a “reasonable probability” that counsel’s errors aﬀected the outcome.90
As another example, consider United States v. Agurs91—a Brady case that
profoundly inﬂuenced not only the trajectory of Brady’s materiality
doctrine,92 but the evolution of prejudice rules outside the Brady context as
well.93 Agurs addressed what materiality test should apply when the defense
had not made a “speciﬁc and relevant request” for favorable evidence known
to the prosecution.94 The Court stated that, on one hand, “[i]f evidence highly
probative of innocence is in [the prosecutor’s] ﬁle, he should be presumed to
recognize its signiﬁcance” and disclose it irrespective of what the defense did
or did not request.95 But “[c]onversely, if evidence actually has no probative
signiﬁcance at all, no purpose would be served by requiring a new trial . . . .”96
So the Court rejected a “severe” rule requiring the defense to prove that
suppressed evidence “probably would have resulted in acquittal.”97 Even so,
the Court insisted that a “judge should not order a new trial every time he is
unable to characterize a nondisclosure as harmless under the customary
harmless-error standard.”98 Instead, the Court concluded that “[t]he proper
standard of materiality”—which “must reﬂect our overriding concern with
the justice of the ﬁnding of guilt”—should focus on whether “the omitted
evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.”99
To be clear, my point here is not that interest balancing is the sole
interpretive modality employed in the Supreme Court’s decisions creating
outcome-centric prejudice-base rights. It is not.100 And even when those
Id.; cf. supra subsection I.B.2 (discussing Strickland’s prejudice standard).
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-78 (1985) (opinion of the Court) (relying
on Agurs); id. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (endorsing “the Strickland formulation of the Agurs
test for materiality”).
93 See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 & n.8 (1984) (relying on Agurs);
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (same); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 866, 868, 874
n.10 (1982) (same).
94 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106; see also id. at 107-14. Though not relevant to the point I am making
here, it bears noting that Agurs’s narrow holding—that the test for materiality should vary depending
on whether the defense lodged a speciﬁc request for evidence that the prosecution suppressed—is
no longer good law. See GERSHMAN, supra note 35, § 5.3.
95 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 111.
98 Id. at 111-12; see also id. at 112 (referring to the federal harmless error standard applicable to
most nonconstitutional errors, which asks whether a reviewing court’s “conviction is sure that the
error did not inﬂuence the jury, or had but very slight eﬀect” (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946))).
99 Id. at 112.
100 As other commentators have noted, some of those decisions employ purposive reasoning by
“constru[ing] a defendant’s rights in light of and as limited by their perceived purpose of ensuring the
reliability of guilty verdicts.” Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88
90
91
92
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decisions do engage in balancing, finality is not the only weight appearing on
the government’s side of the scale. For instance, Bagley and other cases relating
to Brady’s materiality requirement also express the concern that “a broad,
constitutionally required right of discovery ‘would entirely alter the character
and balance of our present systems of criminal justice’” and “displace the
adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered.”101
Neither of these caveats, however, undermines the central premise
advanced in this Section—namely, that interest balancing and remedyspeciﬁc concerns about preserving ﬁnality are prominent, albeit not
exhaustive, justiﬁcatory themes in this body of law. That premise sets the
stage for the next Part, where I will show—at least for Brady and eﬀective
assistance of counsel, and potentially for other outcome-centric prejudicebased rights as well—that the precarious balance the Court sought to strike,
though perhaps understandable when viewed in historical context, is no
longer defensible today.
II. CRITIQUE
This Part sets forth my critique of outcome-centric, right-restricting
prejudice rules. Ordinarily, when courts design rules aimed at safeguarding
the ﬁnality of criminal judgments, they do so through remedial doctrines—
like harmless error,102 forfeiture,103 and so on—that limit defendants’ access
to appellate and postconviction review without altering how procedural rights
get administered at the trial court level. Right-restricting prejudice rules do
not work that way. When prejudice deﬁnes the scope of a right, it becomes
relevant at every stage of the criminal process—not just in appellate and
postconviction proceedings that implicate ﬁnality, but also when trial judges
and, in some instances, prosecutors and police oﬃcers, implement those
COLUM. L. REV. 79, 120 (1988); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984)
(deriving the prejudice requirement for effective assistance claims partly from “[t]he purpose of the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel . . . to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding”). Relatedly, the Court’s cases discussing prejudice
in the context of unenumerated rights often (though not invariably) suggest that case-specific
assessment of prejudice is part and parcel of the “fundamental fairness” inquiry at the heart of due
process doctrine. E.g., Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1974); see also Jerold H. Israel,
Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines,
45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 395-96 (2001) (“[M]any of the due process rulings (although certainly not
all) make a defense showing of likely prejudice an element of the constitutional violation, in contrast
to rulings under most (but not all) specific guarantees . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
101 E.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 & n.7 (1985) (quoting Giles v. Maryland,
386 U.S. 66, 117 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
102 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993) (discussing limits on courts’
“remedial authority” to reverse trial court judgments based on unpreserved claims).
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rights before a defendant has been convicted or sentenced. That is
problematic both because there is rarely a sensible way to forecast the
probability of outcome-determinative prejudice in advance of the outcome
and because, in any event, the law should accord a fair process even when such
process is unlikely to change the outcome.
A. Prejudice-Based Rights at the Trial Court Level
Constitutional criminal procedure gets implemented through a range of
diﬀerent mechanisms, by courts as well as various nonjudicial actors.
Consider the Fourth Amendment.104 Even before the initiation of any court
proceedings, the Fourth Amendment furnishes conduct rules that law
enforcement oﬃcers must obey when carrying out searches and seizures. If
the police violate those rules or are likely to do so imminently, constitutional
search and seizure law can be enforced via civil actions (seeking damages for
past injuries or prospective relief) and also in criminal proceedings (through
the exclusionary rule). In either of these adjudicative settings, appellate relief
is potentially available if the trial court misapplies the relevant legal
principles.105 Since constitutional implementation is a complex process with
many moving parts, structuring constitutional rights to alleviate problems
tied to one remedial context can cause trouble—sometimes inadvertently—
in other contexts.106
That is precisely what has happened, I argue, in the area of prejudicebased rights. With respect to Brady, eﬀective assistance of counsel, and several
other constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has designed right-restricting
prejudice rules to address ﬁnality concerns associated with a particular set of
remedial environments, without carefully assessing how that design might
impact other mechanisms for implementing rights.107 Indeed, the Court often
104 See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1 (5th ed. 2012).
105 Ordinarily, a convicted defendant who unsuccessfully raises a claim of constitutional error
on direct appeal may seek further review in both state and federal postconviction proceedings. See
Lee Kovarsky, Structural Change in State Postconviction Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 44647 (2017). That is not the case, however, for most claims involving the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, which, under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), are noncognizable in federal
postconviction proceedings as long as state courts have “provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation.” Id. at 494.
106 See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Spillover across Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1211, 1218-19 (2014)
(arguing that “[w]hen one remedy aﬀects the scope of a substantive rule, the cross-remedial nature
of that rule threatens to distort its development within other remedial settings”).
107 See generally supra Section I.C (discussing the role of ﬁnality in these doctrinal areas). Some
of the Court’s decisions are less vulnerable to this charge than others. In particular, the Court
expressly recognized in Valenzuela-Bernal that the right-restricting prejudice rule it adopted there
would make the underlying right hard to apply and enforce before trial. See United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 874 (1982) (“Because determinations of materiality are often best
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discusses outcome-centric, right-restricting prejudice rules as though they
were little more than variations on the harmless error doctrine108—which
truly is a remedy-speciﬁc rule with virtually no formal relevance to the
administration of rights before the point of conviction.109 Many scholars have
followed suit, contending that the prejudice requirements found in Brady and
eﬀective assistance doctrine are “functionally indistinguishable” from
harmless error rules,110 or that they are best thought of as “camouﬂaged
harmless error doctrines.”111 There is something to be said for this perspective:
when a convicted defendant seeks relief on appeal or through a postconviction
challenge, the diﬀerences between Strickland’s prejudice standard, for
example, and the generally applicable tests for harmless error are largely a
matter of degree. What these cases and commentators overlook, however, is
that right-restricting prejudice rules can also seriously impair the eﬃcacy of
rights at the trial court level.112
This Section examines the pretrial and midtrial impact of outcomecentric, right-restricting prejudice rules, focusing on two main points. First,
when courts incorporate prejudice into the deﬁnition of rights, prejudice
becomes part of any conduct rules that those rights prescribe for nonjudicial
actors. This in eﬀect authorizes those actors—as relevant here, prosecutors
and police oﬃcers—to withhold procedural safeguards when doing so is
unlikely to aﬀect the outcome. Second, deﬁning rights in terms of prejudice
diminishes the capacity of trial courts to enforce them in cases where
made in light of all of the evidence adduced at trial, judges may wish to defer ruling on motions
until after the presentation of evidence.”).
108 See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679-80 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)
(relevant text quoted in supra note 83).
109 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
110 Epps, supra note 13, at 2162; accord David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of
Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1253 (2005) (contending that
constitutional rights sometimes include “a prejudice component that operates as a kind of internal
harmless error doctrine”).
111 David McCord, Is Death “Different” for Purposes of Harmless Error Analysis? Should It Be?: An
Assessment of United States and Louisiana Supreme Court Case Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1159-62 (1999); accord
Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2002) (“Ineffective
assistance claims . . . appear to incorporate harmless error analysis into the substantive standard.”).
112 John Greabe raised a related point in an essay responding to Epps’s claim that courts should
reconceptualize harmless error rules as restrictions on rights rather than remedies. See John M.
Greabe, Criminal Procedure Rights and Harmless Error: A Response to Professor Epps, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. ONLINE 118, 124 (2018) (objecting that Epps’s proposal would have an unwelcome eﬀect on
how “trial courts . . . rule on motions seeking to enforce [procedural] rights in criminal trials”).
Although Greabe cited the trial-level impact of right-restricting prejudice rules as a reason to resist
the agenda for doctrinal reform urged by Epps, he did not employ that logic to criticize existing law.
See id. at 127 (suggesting that Brady and eﬀective assistance of counsel—the prototypes for Epps’s
proposal—“materially diﬀer” from other rights that Epps would deﬁne in terms of prejudice, and
that Brady and Strickland “may therefore be defensible”). This Article, by contrast, takes aim at Brady,
Strickland, and other facets of current criminal procedure doctrine.
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prejudice cannot be established. Since prejudice-based rights are not violated
by nonprejudicial conduct, trial judges are limited in what they can do to
prevent or sanction such conduct. In short, prejudice-based rights are not
merely “camouﬂaged harmless error doctrines.”113 They are a distinctive body
of law that—unlike the harmless error doctrine—directly shapes how rights
get implemented at the trial court level.
1. Prejudice-Based Conduct Rules for Nonjudicial Actors
To expand on the ﬁrst point, using prejudice to deﬁne rights aﬀects the
conduct rules through which the Constitution guides the behavior of
nonjudicial participants in the criminal process. As courts and scholars
sometimes overlook, constitutional criminal procedure is comprised not only
of “decision rules”—meaning rules “addressed to courts regarding the
consequences of unconstitutional conduct”—but also “conduct rules,” which
“are addressed to [nonjudicial actors] regarding the constitutional legitimacy
of their [behavior].”114 Conduct rules stemming from constitutional rights
become far less demanding (and thus less protective for criminal defendants)
when courts freight those rights with prejudice requirements.
Take Brady as an example.115 The Brady doctrine prescribes a set of conduct
rules that regulate what information prosecutors and the police (jointly, “the
prosecution team”116) must disclose to the defense117 and, as importantly, when
E.g., McCord, supra note 111, at 1159–62.
Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two
Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2470 (1996). Although Steiker’s classic article on the subject states
that conduct rules relate to the “investigative practices” of police oﬃcers, id., I use the term in a
somewhat broader sense that sweeps in any constitutionally derived procedural rules that regulate
the behavior of nonjudicial actors. Judicial conduct, by contrast, is regulated by decision rules (not
conduct rules) in Steiker’s taxonomy, and in this respect, I follow her usage.
115 Like Brady, most outcome-centric prejudice-based rights that the Supreme Court has
recognized also prescribe conduct rules for nonjudicial actors. See generally supra subsection I.B.3. The
right to effective assistance of counsel is arguably an exception to this pattern. Generally speaking, the
Constitution regulates the conduct of the government and its agents—in other words, it regulates state
action. See generally Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L.
REV. 1767, 1769 (2010). The Supreme Court’s right to counsel cases tend to conceptualize defense
lawyers as non-state actors, even when those lawyers are appointed by the state. See, e.g., Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (“The government is not responsible for, and hence not able to
prevent, attorney errors . . . .”). But cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980) (“When a State
obtains a criminal conviction through . . . a trial [in which counsel provided ineffective assistance], it is
the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty.”).
116 E.g., McCormick v. Parker, 821 F.3d 1240, 1246-48 (10th Cir. 2016). Ensuring that the police
communicate all potential Brady information to prosecutors (so that prosecutors, in turn, can decide what
must be turned over to the defense) is among the key challenges confronting courts and other entities
responsible for implementing Brady. See generally Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence
in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743 (2015).
117 See generally supra subsection I.B.1.
113
114
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they must disclose it.118 Precisely what those conduct rules demand from the
prosecution team depends a great deal on whether Brady’s materiality
requirement restricts defendants’ constitutionally guaranteed right to discovery
or, instead, merely limits access to particular remedies for violations of that right.
Suppose, for the moment, that materiality represents a remedial rule—or,
to use this Section’s nomenclature, a “decision rule”119—addressed to
reviewing courts, rather than a core ingredient of the underlying due process
right. Although this supposition is unconventional,120 it is hardly fanciful: It
has been accepted by a number of lower courts confronted with pretrial Brady
disputes,121 and several Supreme Court justices have voiced support for the
idea during oral argument.122 Shorn of the materiality requirement, Brady’s
conduct rule would presumptively123 require the prosecution team to disclose
all relevant evidence that arguably favors the defense, regardless of whether
the evidence has any discernible likelihood of aﬀecting the outcome.124
Somewhat more controversially, this verison of Brady might also obligate the

118 See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11-15 (2015) (describing various
interpretations of Brady’s timing requirements).
119 See Steiker, supra note 114, at 2470.
120 See infra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2005); see generally Hoeﬀel
& Singer, supra note 49, at 483-85 (collecting cases that reject applying Bagley’s materiality rule to
pretrial disclosures).
122 This happened during oral arguments in both Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012), and Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). See Hoeﬀel & Singer, supra note 49, at 482-83 (noting that “[f]ive
Justices . . . expressed the view that Brady requires a prosecutor to disclose pretrial favorable
evidence, regardless of materiality” during the oral argument in Smith, but that the idea nevertheless
“did not make its way into the written opinion”); id. at 475 n.40 (describing Justice Scalia’s hostile
questions aimed at the government’s position that Bagley’s test for materiality limits what the
prosecution must disclose, not just when a reviewing court should reverse based on the prosecution’s
failure to disclose).
123 This obligation is only “presumptive,” for it is subject to exceptions. Even in jurisdictions
that authorize relatively broad discovery in criminal cases (whether as a matter of constitutional law
or otherwise), the government may seek a protective order allowing nondisclosure if it can establish
that disclosure might “endanger the safety of witnesses or the integrity of the investigation.” Jenia
I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases: An Empirical
Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 304 (2016).
124 See, e.g., United States v. Sudikoﬀ, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199-1201 (C.D. Cal. 1999). The
precedential status of Sudikoﬀ is currently uncertain. Although footnotes in several Ninth Circuit
opinions have approvingly cited Sudikoﬀ’s analysis of prosecutors’ pretrial obligations under Brady,
see, e.g., United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1183 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit has more
recently equated Brady’s preconviction standard with its outcome-centric postconviction standard,
see United States v. Lucas, 841 F.3d 796, 799, 807-09 (9th Cir. 2016).
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prosecution team to turn over all disclosable evidence well in advance of
trial,125 perhaps even before entry of a plea.126
Yet as discussed in Part I, the notion that materiality solely restricts
remedies, as opposed to the Brady right itself, sits uncomfortably with the
Supreme Court’s case law. The Court’s decisions in this area suggest, though
arguably in dictum, that materiality is not just a remedial or decision rule
aimed at courts, but is also a determinant of what evidence criminal
defendants are constitutionally entitled to receive from the government.127
Taking their cues from the Supreme Court, many lower courts have classiﬁed
materiality as a right-restricting rule,128 rejecting the remedial conception of
materiality that other courts have adopted.129 Where the right-restricting
view of materiality holds sway, Brady authorizes the prosecution team to
suppress relevant evidence that favors the defense if that evidence is unlikely
to change the outcome.130 And even for potentially outcome-determinative
evidence that must be disclosed in the event of a trial, the conventional
understanding of Brady allows the government to put oﬀ disclosing that
evidence until the eve of trial (sometimes even midtrial) as long as the delay
itself has no probable bearing on the outcome.131 Because the overwhelming
majority of criminal convictions are wrought through pleas, not trials,
Brady—if construed in the traditional fashion—demands literally nothing in
most cases from prosecutors and the police prior to the sentencing stage.
Constitutional law is, of course, not the sole repository of conduct rules
that regulate the behavior of nonjudicial actors. In the area of criminal
discovery, statutes, court rules, professional ethics standards, and internal
prosecutorial guidelines also impose disclosure obligations on the
government, and those obligations are sometimes more demanding than the
constitutional ﬂoor set by the Brady doctrine.132 In particular, all or nearly all
125 See, e.g., United States v. Ford, No. 15-0025(PLF), 2016 WL 482871, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 4,
2016) (“A prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under Brady begin as soon as the case is brought . . . .”).
126 The Supreme Court held in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), that Brady “does not
require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea
agreement with a criminal defendant.” Id. at 633. Lower courts are split about whether Ruiz’s holding
is limited to impeachment-related Brady evidence or whether it encompasses all forms of evidence
favorable to the defense. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 99295 (2012).
127 See supra notes 40–52 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135, 139-44 (2d Cir. 2001).
129 See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., In re Sassounian, 887 P.2d 527, 532-33 & nn.5, 7 (Cal. 1995).
131 See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 868 F. Supp. 207, 211 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
132 See Turner & Redlich, supra note 123, at 302-05 (describing two models adopted by various
states that require prosecutors to turn over signiﬁcantly diﬀerent amounts of evidence before trial).
On occasion, state courts have interpreted due process provisions in their state constitutions to
require broader disclosure than the federal Constitution. See Stephen P. Jones, Note, The Prosecutor’s
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jurisdictions now have ethics rules that, if interpreted according to their plain
meaning, appear to require disclosure of all evidence that favors the defense
irrespective of materiality.133
Nevertheless, the scope of nonconstitutional conduct rules in criminal
procedure can vary substantially from one jurisdiction to the next. That is
certainly the case for criminal discovery.134 And when constitutional doctrine
sets a low bar for prosecutorial and police conduct, nonconstitutional
regulators often unthinkingly follow suit.135 For example, some state courts
have held that the professional ethics standards governing prosecutorial
disclosure mentioned above136 are “coextensive with the obligations required
by Brady”137—meaning that they, too, implicitly contain a materiality
limitation—even though their text lacks any reference to materiality.138 Using
prejudice to deﬁne constitutional rights thus not only enervates
constitutionally derived conduct rules, but it may indirectly exert downward
pressure on parallel nonconstitutional norms as well.
2. Prejudice-Based Trial Court Remedies
Where there is no right, there is no remedy.139 By narrowing the scope of
rights, right-restricting prejudice rules also diminish access to remedies.
Speciﬁcally, such rules limit the power of trial judges to provide remedies—
Constitutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 735, 776-78 & n.210 (1995).
Far more commonly, however, state courts march in lockstep with the Supreme Court’s Brady
jurisprudence when addressing disclosure claims arising under state constitutional law. See, e.g., In
re Sassounian, 887 P.2d at 532-33 & nn.5, 7.
133 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require a prosecutor to “make timely disclosure
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigates the oﬀense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense
and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor” unless a
protective order exempts such disclosure. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1983). According to Laurie Levenson, who helped spearhead a recent discovery reform
initiative in California, all jurisdictions have now adopted “some version of ABA Model Rule 3.8.”
Laurie L. Levenson, The Politics of Ethics, 69 MERCER L. REV. 753, 758 (2018).
134 See supra note 31.
135 See Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 752 (2016)
(warning of “federal law’s gravitational force on the states”).
136 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
137 E.g., In re Seastrunk, 236 So.3d 509, 519 (La. 2017); see also id. at 517-20.
138 By contrast, other state courts, along with many bar associations, have rejected the idea that
Brady’s materiality requirement is implicit in their version of Model Rule 3.8(d), “resulting in a
signiﬁcant split of authority” around this issue. Justin Murray & John Greabe, Disentangling the
Ethical and Constitutional Regulation of Criminal Discovery, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (June 15, 2018),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/disentangling-the-ethical-and-constitutional-regulation-ofcriminal-discovery/ [https://perma.cc/HR3K-L42M].
139 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (highlighting “a general and
indisputable rule” that “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy” (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23)).
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either preventively or as sanctions140—for nonprejudicial conduct that
implicates, but does not formally violate,141 the aﬀected rights.
To pick up where the previous subsection ended, Brady’s materiality
requirement profoundly circumscribes the remedial options available to trial
judges with respect to constitutionally required disclosure. If materiality were
not a right-restricting rule (as some courts hold, but many deny142), trial
judges would have the power, sometimes even an obligation, to aggressively
enforce Brady through a variety of mechanisms.143 To mention just a few
examples, judges could implement Brady by (1) ordering the government to
presumptively144 disclose all evidence that favors the defense without regard
to its likely impact on the outcome;145 (2) conducting an in camera review of
the government’s case ﬁle to verify compliance;146 and (3) imposing sanctions
for noncompliance.147
Conversely, insofar as materiality does restrict the scope of the Brady
right—as the Supreme Court has suggested, and many lower courts have
held148—the remedial framework becomes far less robust. Indeed, the first

140 See supra note 27 (deﬁning remedies as judicial interventions that either prevent or redress
legal wrongs).
141 By deﬁnition, nonprejudicial conduct cannot violate a prejudice-based right. See supra
Section I.A, notes 26–30 and accompanying text. But it is fair to say that such conduct at least
implicates a prejudice-based right if it meets all the requirements needed to violate the right except
for prejudice.
142 See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
143 See, e.g., Cynthia E. Jones, Here Comes the Judge: A Model for Judicial Oversight and Regulation
of the Brady Disclosure Duty, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 87, 89 (2017) (proposing “a comprehensive model
for proactive judicial management” of Brady compliance).
144 Cf. supra note 123 (noting that protective orders can partially exempt the government from
its presumptive disclosure obligations as to particularly sensitive information).
145 See generally Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 59 (2017).
146 At least one commentator has argued that trial courts should automatically review the
government’s ﬁle for Brady information. See Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding
the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391, 42637 (1984). Alternatively, courts could reserve in camera review for cases where red ﬂags suggest likely
noncompliance with the government’s disclosure obligations, see United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d
1500, 1504-05 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (summarizing cases in which the judge conducted an in camera review
after the defense learned of the existence of undisclosed Brady material), or randomly as part of an
audit system, cf. New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working
Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1967 (2010) (proposing that police and
prosecution agencies conduct discovery audits as a method of self-regulation).
147 Depending on the severity of the violation, permissible sanctions might include (1) for mild
violations, a continuance; (2) for intermediate violations, an adverse inference instruction, exclusion
of prosecution evidence, a reprimand, or a referral to the bar for potential disciplinary action; and
(3) for especially serious violations, a contempt citation, dismissal of the indictment, or even
structural remedies directed at the prosecution oﬃce itself. Cf. Jones, supra note 143, at 129-38
(discussing several of these judge-imposed sanctions).
148 See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
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strategy mentioned above (ordering disclosure unlimited by materiality) is a
conceptual nonstarter in jurisdictions that classify materiality as part of the
right. After all, judges lack authority to enforce a materiality-based disclosure
right by ordering broad disclosure without regard to materiality.149 Furthermore,
from a practical standpoint, trial-level application of Brady’s materiality
requirement largely forecloses the second and third strategies listed earlier (in
camera review and sanctions, respectively) as well. As I explain more fully
elsewhere,150 materiality is a complex, “fact-intensive”151 inquiry that judges
are both reluctant and ill-equipped to undertake in a pretrial or midtrial
posture. To the extent, then, that trial judges must find that evidence is likely
to be outcome-determinative as a precondition for ordering the government
to disclose it, or for sanctioning nondisclosure, they may succumb to the
temptation to simply defer to prosecutors’ judgments about materiality and
adopt a laissez-faire stance toward the discovery process.
Much like Brady’s materiality requirement, Strickland’s right-restricting
prejudice rule also diminishes the Constitution’s trial-level remedial
apparatus. In the eﬀective assistance area, my main concern is that Strickland’s
prejudice requirement thwarts prospective challenges alleging that statesupplied indigent defense systems are structurally deﬁcient. Although these
challenges take a variety of forms, many are spearheaded by criminal
defendants, individually or as a class, who have not yet been convicted and
who allege that their constitutional right to eﬀective assistance of counsel will
soon be violated because their attorneys are severely underfunded and
saddled with excessive caseloads.152 Courts often reject such challenges on
prejudice grounds.153 To be sure, prejudice is not the only reason why such
claims fail.154 And in some cases, the challengers have prevailed—in part by
successfully arguing that Strickland’s prejudice requirement is not rightrestricting and, instead, is conﬁned to its native remedial habitat (that is,
149 See, e.g., United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135, 139-46 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Serota,
supra note 49, at 421-31 (critiquing lower federal court decisions in line with Sudikoﬀ that reject a
materiality standard as contrary to the Supreme Court’s Brady jurisprudence).
150 See infra subsection II.B.1.
151 Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2016).
152 See generally David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Eﬀective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and
the Reality, 32 LAW & INEQ. 371, 385-408 (2014) (describing ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims
brought by plaintiﬀs challenging lawyers’ excessive caseloads, conﬂicts of interest, inadequate
resources, and more).
153 See, e.g., Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 363-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to review the
plaintiﬀ ’s Sixth Amendment claim because the plaintiﬀ had had not yet been prejudiced by an unfair
trial); see also infra notes 157–70 and accompanying text.
154 See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Public Defense Litigation: An Overview, 51 IND. L. REV. 89, 9098 (2018) (discussing various obstacles confronting prospective Sixth Amendment claims, including
the unsuitability of the Strickland framework in a preconviction posture, justiciability doctrines,
inability to meet the requirements for class certiﬁcation, and more).
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appellate and postconviction review).155 However, in jurisdictions that adhere
to the conventional view that prejudice restricts the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right itself,156 courts generally leave prospective ineﬀective
assistance claimants empty-handed due to their inability to prove prejudice.
A recent case from Utah is representative. In Cox v. Utah, two defendants
with separately pending criminal cases brought a civil class action, as
plaintiﬀs, on behalf of criminal defendants represented by public defenders
in Washington County against the State of Utah, the County, and various
oﬃcials (collectively, “governmental defendants”).157 They alleged that there
was an “imm[i]nent and serious risk” that their right to eﬀective assistance of
counsel would soon be violated as a result of gross underfunding for indigent
defense and other structural constraints.158 The governmental defendants
ﬁled a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim,
the plaintiﬀs lacked standing, and the claims were not yet ripe.159
The court agreed, and dismissed the suit.160 It noted that “[c]laims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are traditionally governed by . . . Strickland,”161
while also acknowledging that under United States v. Cronic,162 “ineffective
assistance can be actual or constructive.”163 With respect to Strickland, the court
deemed the complaint deficient for two reasons. First, Strickland’s “two-pronged
test” centers on “whether the defendant had the assistance necessary to justify
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding,” but neither plaintiff’s criminal case
had been resolved, so “at this point[,] procedurally, neither can state a claim.”164
Second, “even if Plaintiffs were in a procedural posture to assert such claims,”
“Strickland requires proof of actual prejudice,” and “there is no showing that any
prejudice has been suffered.”165 As for Cronic, the court assumed (without
deciding) that “a pretrial cause of action for constructive ineffective assistance”
155 See, e.g., Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715, 743-47 (Pa. 2016) (holding that the Strickland
test was inapplicable because the plaintiffs were seeking prospective, not postconviction, relief).
156 See supra subsection I.B.2.
157 No. 2:16-cv-53-DB, 2016 WL 6905414, at *1 (D. Utah Nov. 7, 2016).
158 Complaint ¶ 102, Cox, 2016 WL 6905414 [hereinafter Complaint]; see also infra note 243 and
accompanying text. The complaint sought declaratory relief, an injunction that would “restrain[]
Defendants from violating the [right to counsel guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions]”
as well as “requir[e] Defendants to implement a full time indigent defense program on parity with
the same programs which the prosecutors and government attorneys have,” and an award of fees and
costs. Id. at ¶¶ B-E.
159 Cox, 2016 WL 6905414, at *3.
160 See id. at *3-6.
161 Id. at *3.
162 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Cronic carved out a narrow exception to Strickland’s usual requirement
that ineﬀective assistance claimants must prove a reasonable probability of outcome-determinative
prejudice. See generally supra note 58 and accompanying text.
163 Cox, 2016 WL 6905414 at *3.
164 Id. at *5.
165 Id. at *6.
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might be cognizable in some situations.166 But the court said that to establish
such a claim, the plaintiffs would have to bear the “hefty burden”167 of showing
that “deficient performance [is] widespread and systemic,”168 resulting in an
“aggregate of harm” that is “pervasive and persistent.”169 The complaint did not
satisfy that standard, according to the court, since some of the plaintiffs’
allegations were too conclusory while others, though “more specific,” still
“fail[ed] to illustrate how any of the Plaintiffs have been harmed.”170
Strickland’s prejudice prong also occasionally precludes nonsystemic
ineﬀective assistance claims, raised before conviction, alleging that defense
counsel has furnished deﬁcient representation.171 This seems to happen
infrequently, however. When credible allegations of bad lawyering come to
light before entry of judgment, trial judges have the power to appoint
substitute counsel without requiring proof of a likely eﬀect on the outcome.172
So for preconviction ineﬀective assistance claims predicated on identiﬁable
attorney errors, as opposed to structural defects, it appears that Strickland’s
right-restricting prejudice rule has had only a limited impact.
But this is cold comfort. Although motions for substitute counsel based
on alleged ineﬀectiveness are commonly raised by indigent defendants, they
are greeted with skepticism by judges.173 And even when they are successful,
they do not disrupt the underlying systemic determinants of inadequate
attorney performance. Structural deﬁciencies call for structural remedies,174

See id. at *4 (acknowledging that other courts have recognized such a claim).
Id. (quoting Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715, 740 (Pa. 2016)).
Id. (citing Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 123 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009)).
Id. (quoting Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 123-24).
Id. at *5. The court then held that the plaintiﬀs lacked standing and that their claims were
not ripe, cross-referencing its earlier disposition on the merits. Id. at *6.
171 In United States v. Carmichael, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2005), for example, the
defendant asserted before trial that incriminating statements he had made to DEA agents must be
suppressed because the statements resulted from ineﬀectiveness on the part of his lawyer. (The
defendant’s lawyer had advised him to visit the DEA’s oﬃce, unaccompanied, to retrieve his seized
personal belongings that the DEA was not holding as evidence. Id.) The court rejected the
defendant’s claim as “premature,” emphasizing that “the very standard for prevailing on an
ineﬀective-assistance-of-counsel claim appears to preclude such claims prior to an actual conviction.”
Id. at 1333. Because “there is no outcome or result in [the] case yet,” the court concluded that “it is
impossible . . . to show prejudice as deﬁned by Strickland at this stage.” Id.
172 See generally Peter A. Joy, A Judge’s Duty to Do Justice: Ensuring the Accused’s Right to the
Eﬀective Assistance of Counsel, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 164-69 (2017).
173 See id. at 164 & n.186.
174 There is a robust debate—which this Article informs but does not resolve—regarding
whether structural reform litigation can achieve meaningful and long-lasting change for
underperforming indigent defense systems. Compare Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of
Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 2701-05 (2013) (viewing with cautious optimism the potential impact
of structural litigation on indigent defense conditions), with Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 1751, 1788-1803 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL
166
167
168
169
170
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yet as we have seen, structural remedies are all too often foreclosed by the
ineﬀective assistance doctrine’s prejudice requirement.175
B. The Pitfalls of Ex Ante Prejudice Analysis
Constitutional criminal procedure is animated by two main objectives: (1)
safeguarding the accused against unfair outcomes, and (2) ensuring that
outcomes are obtained through a process that is itself fair.176 Outcomecentric, right-restricting prejudice rules stymie both objectives. Trial judges,
prosecutors, and police oﬃcers cannot safely predict ex ante whether
suppression of evidence, deﬁcient representation by defense counsel, or other
deprivations are likely to bring about an unfair outcome in any particular case.
And even if they could perform that function in a reliable way, the law
generally should not let them, because procedural fairness advances a number
of “non-truth-furthering interests” that can still be jeopardized without
prejudice to the outcome.177
1. Unfair Outcomes
Recall that the Supreme Court’s landmark cases about outcome-centric
prejudice-based rights reﬂect an eﬀort to ensure that outcomes are fair to the
accused without unduly trenching on countervailing state interests like
ﬁnality.178 Strickland, for example, asserts that the core “purpose” driving the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “ensur[ing] a fair trial,”179 which,
according to the Court, means “a trial whose result is reliable.”180 The
doctrinal test announced in Strickland thus purports to help courts identify
and intervene in situations where “counsel’s conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result.”181
Outcome-centric prejudice-based rights cannot make good on this
commitment. It is immensely difficult to predict outcome-determinative
prejudice ex ante, before a criminal case has culminated in an outcome.182 And
when the likelihood of prejudice is radically uncertain, as it typically is during
POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S
PRISONS (1998)) (taking a dimmer view of the prospects for indigent defense reform litigation).
175 See supra notes 153–70 and accompanying text.
176 See generally Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoﬀ, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1091-95 (1977).
177 Murray, supra note 16, at 1795 (internal quotation marks omitted).
178 See supra Section I.C.
179 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
180 Id. at 687.
181 Id. at 686.
182 See infra notes 187–216 and accompanying text.

2020]

Prejudice-Based Rights

307

the early stages of a prosecution, the accused will lose, since outcome-centric
prejudice-based rights assign to the defense the burden of establishing
prejudice.183 Although appellate and (sometimes) postconviction review is
theoretically available to scrutinize unreliable first-instance prejudice
determinations, that is a woefully inadequate substitute for well-functioning
error-prevention mechanisms at the trial level for a host of reasons,184 not least
that the majority of convicted defendants never even file an appeal,185 and fewer
still seek postconviction relief.186 For these defendants, getting things right the
first time is all that matters, since there will not be a second opportunity.
Even under favorable epistemic circumstances, assessing outcomedeterminative prejudice is a complex and precarious enterprise.187 At its core,
prejudice analysis involves estimating “the impact of the [potentially
prejudicial event] on the minds of other men, not on one’s own, in the total
setting.”188 Whether the object of inquiry is a plea-bargained outcome,189 a
jury’s verdict at trial,190 or a judge-imposed sentence,191 the court or other
entity evaluating prejudice “must judge others’ reactions not by his own, but
with allowance for how others might react”192—a challenging task that
demands a possibly unrealistic level of intersubjective understanding.193
Moreover, prejudice analysis has to look at the totality of the circumstances,
since the outcomes of criminal cases ordinarily stem from diverse causal
See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696; see also infra note 224 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 217–26 and accompanying text.
See Nancy J. King, Appeals, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 254-55.
See Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance after Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2438-42 (2013).
Indeed, Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court viewed one common form
of outcome-centric prejudice analysis (harmless error review) as the “most pervasive and elusive of
all problems” confronted by appellate courts. ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS
ERROR 4 (1970).
188 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
189 See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1985).
190 See, e.g., Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 758-77.
191 See, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001).
192 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764.
193 Compare Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Evaluating the Prejudicial Eﬀect of Evidence: Can Judges
Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1147, 1173-76 (ﬁnding that judges’
and lawyers’ estimates of the potential prejudice associated with various kinds of evidence in survey
responses diverged substantially from laypersons’ estimates), with D. Alex Winkelman et al., An
Empirical Method for Harmless Error, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1405, 1423 (2014) (ﬁnding that laypersons’
reactions to vignettes loosely derived from the fact patterns of several published harmless error
decisions had “some correspondence to the harmless error determinations made by real courts”).
Available evidence suggests that assessments of outcome-determinative prejudice are especially
erratic and unreliable in connection with the penalty phase of capital trials, where the stakes could
not possibly be higher. See, e.g., Kamin, supra note 111, at 62-63 (ﬁnding, based on a review of death
penalty decisions by the California Supreme Court between 1976 and 1996, that during this period
“the reversal rate in capital cases dropped from 94% to 14%” and that the court’s “diﬀerential use of
the harmless error doctrine” accounted for “nearly all of the diﬀerence in death penalty outcomes”).
183
184
185
186
187
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factors that collectively persuade the relevant decisionmaker, not a single item
of evidence or other factor considered in a vacuum.194 Assessing prejudice is
therefore a “fact-intensive” process that requires a large investment of scarce
time and attention to do properly—an investment that courts and other actors
are not always willing or able to make.195
What sort of information would we need in order to calculate outcomedeterminative prejudice in an accurate manner? Ideally, we would have direct
evidence revealing the factors that determined or will determine the outcome.
By way of example, direct evidence of prejudice can include: (1) for a pleabargained outcome, credible testimony by the defendant regarding why she
or he opted to plead guilty or go to trial;196 (2) for a jury verdict, notes the
jury may have submitted to the trial court revealing how it viewed the facts;197
or (3) for a sentence imposed by a court, the reasons the court articulated to
justify that sentence.198 Often, however, little or no direct evidence relating
to prejudice is available, and the best we can hope to have is circumstantial
evidence tending to show how a reasonable person in the decisionmaker’s
position would act.199 The most common forms of circumstantial evidence
courts cite in connection with prejudice analysis are the persuasiveness of the
prosecution’s case (either as to guilt or to the appropriate sentence) and
whether the potentially prejudicial event substantially strengthens the
prosecution’s hand.200
Just as importantly, the integrity of prejudice analysis depends on
objective evaluation. Even if there are compelling reasons to suspect that
prejudice will occur or has occurred, that conclusion might not carry the day

See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695-96 (1984).
Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2016).
See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1966-68 (2017). But see id. at 1967 (cautioning
that “[c]ourts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about
how he would have pleaded” and “should instead look to contemporaneous evidence”).
197 See, e.g., United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 126-27 (1st Cir. 2000).
198 See, e.g., Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345-49 (2016).
199 See, e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
200 See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). Scholars dispute whether and
to what extent courts examining outcome-determinative prejudice should consider the strength of
the prosecution’s untainted evidence against the defendant. See generally Murray, supra note 16, at
1800-05 (summarizing the debate and explaining my own perspective on this issue). But judges
generally treat “the strength of the case against the defendant” as “[p]erhaps the single most
signiﬁcant factor” when calculating the probability of prejudice. 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 854 (4th ed. 2019).
194
195
196

2020]

Prejudice-Based Rights

309

if the inquirer has vested interests201 or cognitive biases202 clouding his or her
judgment. Whenever possible, the law should make judges—not prosecutors
or other interested parties—responsible for estimating the likelihood of
prejudice to the outcome.203
To generalize from this discussion, detecting outcome-determinative
prejudice depends on access to probative information and objectivity in evaluating
that information. When prejudice is evaluated ex ante, as outcome-centric
prejudice-based rights require, the ﬁrst of these criteria (access to
information) is not met. And some outcome-centric prejudice-based rights,
such as Brady, ﬂunk the second criterion (objectivity) as well.
Most fundamentally, the information one would need to accurately
measure prejudice is rarely known before trial court proceedings have
concluded. Direct evidence of outcome-determinative prejudice almost never
exists during the early stages of a criminal case and usually emerges, if at all,
only at trial, at a sentencing hearing, or during a subsequent postconviction
proceeding.204 Circumstantial evidence of prejudice is also in short supply
when cases ﬁrst commence, though such evidence tends to accumulate as
cases move through later stages of the criminal process. For cases that get
tried, the trial itself may provide a wealth of data—including the facts
introduced by each side,205 opening statements,206 closing arguments,207 jury
notes,208 and so on—that lessens the uncertainty inherent in attempting to
discern “the impact of [a potentially prejudicial event] on the minds of other
men.”209 But a vanishingly small fraction of criminal cases culminate in a
201 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the
Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 140-41 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006)
(arguing, with respect to Brady, that “even if [prosecutors] see that . . . evidence is exculpatory, they
may not see how it is material” because the “traditions, culture, and incentives of our adversarial
system” encourage them to “have favorable win–loss records and rack up many convictions”).
202 See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griﬃn, Criminal Adjudication, Error Correction, and Hindsight Blind Spots,
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 190-91 (2016) (examining how hindsight bias and other cognitive
errors can distort prejudice analysis to defendants’ disadvantage).
203 That said, even courts are inﬂuenced by incentives (like preserving ﬁnality, see supra Section
I.C) and psychological impediments (like hindsight bias, see, e.g., Griﬃn, supra note 202) that can
detract from their capacity to reliably gauge prejudice.
204 See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.
205 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
206 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 297 (1991).
207 See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24-26 (1967).
208 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
209 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946); see also supra notes 187–95 and
accompanying text. However, crucial information bearing on prejudice is often missing even when
a trial has occurred. For instance, the trial record that gets reviewed by an appellate or postconviction
court is a “cold record” stripped of potentially relevant information—especially demeanor
evidence—that might have mattered to the factﬁnder. E.g., Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But
Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (1995). But
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trial.210 In cases resolved through plea deals—in other words, the vast
majority of cases that end in a conviction—a judge or other actor evaluating
prejudice in an ex ante posture usually has only meager information regarding
both sides’ potential theories of the case and the facts supporting each theory.
And even with respect to the few cases that do go to trial, key decisions
concerning prejudice (such as prosecutors’ assessments of materiality under
Brady) sometimes take place before trial, without the beneﬁt of whatever
prejudice-related data the trial later generates.211
Courts have intermittently recognized these informational obstacles to
evaluating prejudice ex ante—and cited them as reasons to avoid even trying to
enforce outcome-centric prejudice-based rights in a preventative mode. In
several of its cases concerning “constitutionally guaranteed access to
evidence,”212 for example, the Supreme Court has remarked that
“determinations of materiality are often best made in light of all of the evidence
adduced at trial” and thus that “judges may wish to defer ruling on [materiality]
until after the presentation of evidence.”213 In a similar vein, in the effective
assistance of counsel context, some lower courts have rejected prospective
claims on the ground that such claims “are not reviewable . . . [because] we have
no proceeding and outcome from which to base our analysis.”214
To make matters worse, some outcome-centric prejudice-based rights
entrust the task of assessing prejudice to nonjudicial decisionmakers who lack
the neutrality to do the job properly. Brady doctrine, for example, relies on the
prosecution team to make the first—and usually, the last—assessment of what
evidence the government can suppress without prejudicing the outcome, as
well as how long the government can postpone disclosing potentially outcomedeterminative evidence before the delay itself is likely to affect the outcome.215
Prosecutors and police officers, however well-intentioned, approach these
questions as interested parties whose priors are naturally colored by their
see Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1991) (questioning the
accuracy of demeanor evidence in evaluating witness credibility).
210 See Jenia I. Turner, Plea Bargaining, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 31, at
73 & n.2.
211 Although prosecutors have a “continuing obligation” to ensure the completeness of their
Brady disclosures as new information comes to light, e.g., Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567,
588 (7th Cir. 2012), prosecutors’ incentives and biases may deter them from revisiting their initial
evaluations of materiality, see Baer, supra note 118, at 31-43.
212 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982).
213 Id. at 874; see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 3-26 (1971) (holding that the
prosecution’s delay in indicting the defendant did not warrant dismissal because any claim of prejudice
would be “speculative and premature” until “[e]vents of the trial . . . demonstrate actual prejudice”).
214 Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); see also supra notes 153–71.
215 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“[T]he prosecution, which alone can know
what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net eﬀect of
all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of ‘reasonable probability’ is reached.”).
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professional role “in the often competitive enterprise” of enforcing the
criminal law.216 They should not be in the business of deciding what evidence
favors the defense strongly enough to create a reasonable probability of an
acquittal or a reduced sentence—and to suppress defense evidence that, in
their view, does not meet that high threshold.
Finally, we cannot depend on appellate and postconviction courts to set
things right when outcome-centric prejudice-based rights misﬁre at the trial
court level.217 Although reviewing courts conducting prejudice analysis after
the fact often have better information to work with than do trial judges
endeavoring to anticipate prejudice ex ante,218 their eﬀorts are handicapped
by the fact that just a fraction of convicted defendants challenge their
convictions or sentences on appeal,219 and an even smaller proportion pursue
postconviction review.220 Needless to say, reviewing courts cannot rectify
prejudicial errors that defendants do not bring to their attention.221 Moreover,
even when defendants who have well-founded claims of prejudicial error do
seek appellate or postconviction relief, there is a risk that courts reviewing

216 Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth
Amendment . . . consists in requiring that [factual] inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the oﬃcer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.”). As other scholars have persuasively argued, prosecutors’ adversarial function
requires them to construct a theory of guilt, which “trigger[s] cognitive biases[] such as conﬁrmation
bias and selective information processing” that diminish their ability “to see materiality where it
might in fact exist.” Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1611-12 (2006).
217 Indeed, we now know—through empirical work on wrongful convictions—that reviewing
courts often cite a lack of outcome-determinative prejudice as a reason to reject claims under Brady,
Strickland, and other procedural rights even in cases involving innocent defendants who were
subsequently exonerated. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
107-09 (2008) (analyzing 133 written rulings in cases where people were subsequently exonerated
through postconviction DNA testing).
218 See supra notes 204–09 and accompanying text. That said, ex post prejudicial analysis suﬀers
from several oﬀsetting disadvantages when compared with ex ante assessment, including the lack of
postconviction counsel, see infra note 221, the heavy incentive to aﬃrm for the sake of ﬁnality, see
supra note 203, and hindsight bias, see id.
219 See supra note 185.
220 See supra note 186.
221 There are all kinds of reasons why defendants—even those who have been wrongfully
convicted or sentenced—might not pursue appellate and postconviction review. See, e.g., Eve
Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineﬀective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 692-95 (2007). Many defendants, especially those serving
relatively short sentences, are deterred by the prolonged delays that appellate and postconviction
litigation entail. See id. at 693-94. Others have no access to counsel (at the postconviction stage) and
are not in a position to go at it alone. See id. at 692-94. And some defendants simply lack knowledge
about the errors that might support a claim for relief—particularly when the type of error in question
is the suppression of Brady evidence, which is by nature hidden from view unless and until the
concealed evidence is fortuitously discovered. See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v.
Maryland, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 536-37 (2007).
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those claims will reject them anyway due to deﬁcient pleading or brieﬁng
(especially at the postconviction stage, where most defendants have to
proceed pro se222), incentives to preserve ﬁnality,223 the stringent burden of
proof that defendants must satisfy under Bagley, Strickland, and related
cases,224 and other reasons.225
In law as in life, prevention is the best medicine.226 If procedural law is
set up to fail on the front end, there is only so much that reviewing courts
can do to clean up the mess retrospectively.
2. Unfair Process
Achieving fair outcomes is perhaps the single most important function of
criminal procedure. But that is not its sole function. In its better moments,
criminal procedure also aspires to protect “a diverse array of ‘non-truthfurthering’ interests—interests that include providing defendants with space for
autonomous decisionmaking, enforcing compliance with antidiscrimination
norms, and making transparent the inner workings of criminal justice—in
addition to ‘truth-furthering’ objectives.”227 So even in cases where a defendant’s
guilt and merited sentence are not seriously open to question, and the correct
outcome is readily apparent, the key ingredients of a fair process should extend
to the “innocent and guilty alike.”228
Outcome-centric prejudice-based rights are at odds with this principle.
By deﬁning prejudice solely in terms of the outcome, these rights obscure
other forms of harm—involving non-truth-furthering interests—that can also
result when the criminal process is unfair. For instance, when a prosecutor
knowingly suppresses evidence that is favorable under Brady, the defendant
is deprived of a full opportunity to prepare and present his or her defense,
and societal interests—relating to transparency and checks and balances—
may be compromised as well.229 Likewise, when an indigent defendant’s
See supra note 221.
See supra note 203.
See infra notes 284–85 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra notes 202–03 (discussing hindsight bias).
The Supreme Court captured this idea nicely in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966),
where it stated that “reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent
the prejudice at its inception.” Or as Benjamin Franklin famously wrote, “an Ounce of Prevention is
worth a Pound of Cure.” PA. GAZETTE, Feb. 4, 1735, at Numb. 322 (published anonymously).
227 Murray, supra note 16, at 1795 (quoting, respectively, Stacy & Dayton, supra note 100, at 94,
and Cover & Aleinikoﬀ, supra note 176, at 1092) (footnotes omitted). I acknowledge, of course, that
the criminal justice system’s commitment to these goals is inconstant, and often gives way when
competing interests assert themselves. Cf. supra Section I.C; see generally Darryl K. Brown, The
Perverse Eﬀects of Eﬃciency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183, 187-89 (2014).
228 E.g., Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956).
229 See infra notes 233–41 and accompanying text.
222
223
224
225
226
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court-appointed lawyer is grossly ineﬀective, the defendant’s opportunity to
be heard (whether through counsel or otherwise) is hampered, and our
collective commitment to equal justice for the rich and the poor is
degraded.230 In each example, unfair processes (evidence suppression or
deﬁcient representation, respectively) cause harm both to the defendant and
to various public goods, and they do so regardless of whether the defendant
is guilty or whether the unfairness might aﬀect the outcome.231 Yet outcomecentric prejudice-based rights do not recognize—and thus fail to adequately
guard against—the harms associated with procedural unfairness in cases
where the outcome is not on the line.
First consider Brady. As discussed earlier, Brady’s materiality inquiry
centers on whether an unfair procedural event (speciﬁcally, the government’s
suppression of evidence that favors the defense) might inﬂuence the
outcome.232 That inquiry fails to account for any non-truth-furthering
interests that may be harmed by evidence suppression. Are there any such
interests? I believe there are.
One is the accused’s autonomy interest in preparing and presenting a
defense.233 A defense—whether it relates to liability or the appropriate
sentence—has to be stitched together from facts that lend it plausibility.
Those facts, however, frequently lie in the possession of the government due
to its superior investigative resources and other advantages.234 So when the
government fails to disclose facts that favor a potential defense, the defendant
might choose not to present that defense—deterred by the apparent absence
of supporting facts—opting instead for some other (perhaps less viable)
theory or, in many instances, no theory at all.235 Silencing criminal defendants
See infra notes 242–64 and accompanying text.
Needless to say, the accused and the community as a whole both suffer an additional—and
more severe—harm when procedural unfairness results in an unfair outcome. But this does not
undercut my point that unfair processes can cause serious harm even when the outcome is unaffected.
232 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
233 See Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control the
Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1187 (2010) (describing and arguing in support of “the criminal
defendant’s autonomy interest . . . to control the presentation of his defense”).
234 See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Diﬀerent?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1731-48
(1993). This is not to say that prosecutors have access to ample resources; in many jurisdictions, they
do not. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 266-79 (2011). But as
between indigent defendants—which is to say, most criminal defendants—and prosecutors, working
in close coordination with the police, it is clear which side holds the relative advantage. See, e.g.,
Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90
IOWA L. REV. 219, 230-42 (2004).
235 Defendants generally know, of course, whether or not they committed the charged crime,
and they have a right to testify on their own behalf. But unless defendants can corroborate their
accounts with supporting evidence, factﬁnders tend to doubt the credibility of their testimony, and
many defendants—realizing this—are understandably reluctant to provide it. See, e.g., Theodore
230
231
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in this fashion is injurious in and of itself, even if there is nothing the
defendant or defense witnesses could say that might persuade the factﬁnder
to acquit or to reduce the defendant’s sentence.236
The suppression of favorable evidence by the government also threatens
the public’s interest in a transparent criminal process that has the capacity to
hold executive power in check.237 When favorable evidence gets disclosed, the
defense then has the option to communicate that evidence to judges, juries,238
and the broader community, setting in motion various mechanisms for
maintaining governmental accountability.239 Conversely, when the
government conceals such evidence, it keeps these stakeholders in the dark
and undermines their supervisory functions.240 In a plea-dominated system
characterized by vast prosecutorial discretion and minimal public awareness
and engagement, it is dangerous to stack the deck further by permitting the
government to hide evidence that favors the defense.241
The Strickland doctrine and its prejudice requirement are vulnerable to an
analogous critique. Let us begin by revisiting Cox v. Utah—a case introduced
earlier in which a putative class of defendants facing as-yet-unresolved
criminal charges brought a civil action as plaintiﬀs challenging the indigent
defense system in Washington County, Utah.242 The complaint alleged, in a
nutshell, that the defendants’ right to eﬀective assistance of counsel was “in
imminent danger of being violated because the indigent defense program . . .
lacks ‘suﬃcient funding, suﬃcient attorney and professional staﬀ, training,
workload limits, adequate contracting standards, [and] adequate attorney
Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Eﬀect of a Prior Criminal Record
on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1357 (2009).
236 See generally Alexandra Natapoﬀ, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1449, 1475-1504 (2005).
237 Cf. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995) (encouraging, though not requiring,
prosecutors to presumptively disclose all favorable evidence irrespective of its probable eﬀect on the
outcome, reasoning that “[s]uch disclosure will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor” and to
“preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor’s private deliberations, as the chosen
forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations”).
238 See Jason Kreag, The Jury’s Brady Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 345, 395 (2018) (arguing that the
suppression of favorable evidence by the government harms not only defendants, but also
“individual jurors and the institution of the jury”).
239 Even where defendants opt to plead guilty (as is obviously the norm) instead of going to
trial, the disclosure of favorable evidence gives the defense some leverage in plea negotiations with
the prosecution, generating at least a limited constraint on prosecutorial power. And whether the
defendant pleads guilty or chooses to go to trial, he or she may present favorable evidence during
the sentencing hearing.
240 See Jason Kreag, Disclosing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 72 VAND. L. REV. 297, 333-39 (2019)
(discussing Brady’s importance in validating the interests of jury members, victims, and the broader
political community).
241 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 911 (2006).
242 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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qualiﬁcation standards.’”243 The court tossed the suit at the pleading stage
mainly because the plaintiﬀs could not show that the county’s allegedly
defective indigent defense scheme would cause outcome-determinative
prejudice in their separately pending criminal prosecutions.244
This analysis overlooks that the right to counsel serves a number of
diﬀerent functions in our quasi-adversarial245 justice system, functions that
cannot be reduced to the single dimension of how counsel’s assistance might
inﬂuence case outcomes.246 For one thing, as the Supreme Court recognized
in Powell v. Alabama, the assistance of counsel is a vital aspect of the
defendant’s “right to be heard,” which “would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”247 This right to be
heard, according to Powell, is “among the immutable principles of justice”248
that must be aﬀorded to all defendants, “[h]owever guilty [they] might prove
to have been.”249 Moreover, certain facets of right to counsel doctrine—in
particular, Gideon’s guarantee of court-appointed counsel for (some250)
indigent defendants—reﬂect the principle that “every defendant stands equal

243 Cox v. Utah, No. 2:16-cv-53-DB, 2016 WL 6905414, at *2 (D. Utah Nov. 7, 2016) (quoting
Complaint, supra note 158, ¶ 38). Among other things, the plaintiﬀs asserted that: (1) defense
attorneys contracting with the governmental defendants toiled under “unmanageably large
workloads,” Complaint ¶ 78, and many of them “rarely, if ever, investigate[d] the charges” against
their clients, id. ¶ 71, as evidenced by the fact that the lawyer for one of the named plaintiﬀs was
responsible for at least 350 cases, roughly eighty percent of them felonies, id. ¶ 43; see also id. ¶ 85
(alleging that two former public defenders each closed over 350 felonies in FY 2015); (2) the indigent
defense program was seriously underfunded, see id. ¶¶ 87-91, since Washington County allocated
only $760,688 for the defense program while budgeting $2,816,540 for prosecutions, id. ¶¶ 8-10, so
some lawyers would “rely solely on police detective work, or forego legal research and factual
investigations necessary for constitutionally adequate legal representation,” id. ¶ 91; and (3) the
governmental defendants would “hire, award contracts to, or appoint attorneys who have neither the
experience, inclination, nor resources to provide adequate legal representation,” id. ¶ 48, and who
“will not challenge the county attorney by advocating vigorously for their clients,” id. ¶ 51.
244 See supra notes 160–70 and accompanying text.
245 Cf. Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialsim: Accounting for Deference in Pretrial Criminal
Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 811 (2014) (analyzing components of the contemporary criminal
justice system that “are more resonant with institutional and professional attributes of Continental,
inquisitorial systems of criminal justice than the traditional conception of the American system”).
246 See generally Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Eﬀective Assistance of
Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59 (1986).
247 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). Powell was the Court’s ﬁrst major decision concerning the
constitutional right of indigent defendants to receive court-appointed counsel, though the case arose
under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Sixth since the latter had not yet been applied to
the states. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99
MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000).
248 Powell, 287 U.S. at 68.
249 Id. at 52.
250 See supra note 53 (explaining that the guarantee of court-appointed counsel does not apply
in misdemeanor prosecutions that do not result in imprisonment).
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before the law.”251 That principle “cannot be realized,” as Gideon explains, “if
the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him” while others are able to “hire the best lawyers they can get to
prepare and present their defenses.”252 And ﬁnally, criminal procedure’s
“detailed regulatory system” for holding governmental power in check
“depends for its enforcement on criminal defense counsel, the private
attorneys general of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.”253 Without
an “adequate level of litigation by . . . defense counsel,” that regulatory
system collapses.254
All of these objectives are undermined where, as was alleged in Cox, the
government’s indigent defense delivery system is structurally unsound.255 If
the Cox plaintiffs were correct that—due to underfunding and other systemic
constraints—many indigent defense lawyers in Washington County “rarely, if
ever, investigate[d] the charges”256 and “regularly fail[ed] to devote sufficient
time to interviewing and counseling” their clients,257 we could hardly expect
those lawyers to vindicate their clients’ “right to be heard” in the manner
envisioned by Powell.258 To the contrary, defense lawyers operating under such
conditions risk becoming complicit in a dehumanizing system of “assembly
line justice” that rushes clients en masse into plea deals without meaningfully
considering their particular circumstances.259 Likewise, if the County awarded
defense contracts to “attorneys who have neither the experience, inclination,
nor resources to provide adequate legal representation to indigent clients,” as
the putative class of criminal defendants alleged,260 its attorney appointment
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
Id.; see also Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1220-40 (2013) (discussing indigent defendants’ right to equal access to the
courts). In some respects, however, Sixth Amendment doctrine privileges the right to choose one’s
own counsel—a right that is in eﬀect oﬀ the table for most indigent defendants—over the right to
a reasonably eﬀective court-appointed lawyer for defendants who lack the means to hire counsel.
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145-52 (2006) (holding that prejudice is not
required to establish a Sixth Amendment violation when a court intrudes on a defendant’s
prerogative to retain a lawyer he or she chooses).
253 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALE L.J. 1, 19-20 (1997).
254 Id. at 12; accord United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (noting that the right to
counsel is “a fundamental component of our criminal justice system” as it enables a defendant to
assert any other rights he or she may have).
255 See supra notes 242–43 and accompanying text.
256 Complaint, supra note 158, ¶ 71.
257 Id. ¶ 70.
258 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (describing the “right to be heard” as
involving “the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him [or her]” because,
without such involvement, a layperson may lack the skill or knowledge to mount a serious defense).
259 E.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Eﬀective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 137, 148 (1986).
260 Complaint, supra note 158, ¶ 48.
251
252
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scheme could not possibly ensure, in Gideon’s words, that “every defendant
stands equal before the law.”261 Furthermore, insofar as the lawyers appointed
by the County were “unable to act as an effective adversarial check upon the
prosecution,”262 they ceased to function as the “private attorneys general” on
which our system of criminal procedure “depends for its enforcement.”263 Yet
the court in Cox failed to take these concerns seriously, echoing the Supreme
Court’s own disinclination—displayed in Strickland and other ineffective
assistance cases—to do anything about deficient representation that does not
result in outcome-determinative prejudice.264
I do not claim that outcome-centric prejudice-based rights aﬀord zero
protection for non-truth-furthering interests. As I have explained in a
previous article, in connection with the harmless error doctrine, outcomecentric prejudice rules provide some refuge for non-truth-furthering interests
to the extent that both of two conditions are met.265 First, the non-truthfurthering interest must be “result-correlated,” meaning that the interest is
likely to be impaired in situations where the result is aﬀected, but unlikely to
be harmed otherwise.266 Second, the entity evaluating prejudice must be able
to reliably determine whether the outcome will be or has been aﬀected, since
that question is the proxy by which outcome-centric prejudice rules indirectly
secure non-truth-furthering interests that are result-correlated.267
Although outcome-centric prejudice rules do provide some incidental
protection for criminal procedure’s non-truth-furthering interests, they were
not designed with that function in mind.268 And they are not much good at
it, either. Regarding the ﬁrst condition mentioned above (result-correlation),
the non-truth-furthering interests that are jeopardized by evidence
suppression and deﬁcient representation are only partly result-correlated.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
Complaint, supra note 158, ¶ 92.
Stuntz, supra note 253, at 19-20.
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (“The object of an
ineﬀectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an
ineﬀectiveness claim on the ground of lack of suﬃcient prejudice, which we expect will often be so,
that course should be followed.”).
265 See Murray, supra note 16.
266 Id. at 1814 (deﬁning result-correlated interests and distinguishing them from “resultindependent interest[s], . . . for which there is no strict correlation between the degree to which an
error harms the . . . interest and the likelihood that the error aﬀected the result”). For instance, the
privacy interest safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is “a non-truthfurthering interest that is heavily result-correlated,” since pro-prosecution errors “cause harm to that
interest only to the degree that they enhance the probability of conviction.” Id. at 1815.
267 See id. at 1814-15.
268 See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92 (deriving the prejudice requirement for ineﬀective
assistance of counsel claims partly from “[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
counsel . . . to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome
of the proceeding”).
261
262
263
264
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This is especially true in cases where the prosecution’s evidence against the
defendant is overwhelming (or is perceived to be so by the relevant
decisionmaker)—a circumstance that renders nonprejudicial “almost any
error, even those that gravely compromise the fairness of the proceeding.”269
As for the second condition (reliable evaluation), outcome-centric prejudicebased rights get a failing grade for the reasons articulated earlier.270 Outcomecentric, right-restricting prejudice rules are thus incompatible with the basic
principle that every criminal defendant is entitled to a fair process regardless
of his or her guilt or innocence.
III. PATHS FORWARD
This Part proposes an agenda for doctrinal reform targeted at the Brady
rule, eﬀective assistance of counsel, and potentially other outcome-centric
prejudice-based rights.271 The agenda has two complementary components.
The ﬁrst involves extricating prejudice from the deﬁnition of procedural
rights and classifying it as a remedial question—in short, moving prejudice
from rights to remedies. The goal behind this part of my proposal is to allow
consideration of prejudice in the remedial contexts where its justiﬁcations are
strongest, including appellate and postconviction review, while
circumscribing prejudice analysis at the trial court level where ﬁnality is not
at stake. The second component involves redeﬁning what the law means by
prejudice. As explained in Part II, procedural unfairness can cause harm to
non-truth-furthering interests—such as defendants’ autonomy interest in
having a meaningful opportunity to be heard, or society’s interest in
transparency—even in cases where the outcome is not aﬀected.272 Outcomecentric tests for prejudice ignore such harm. The alternative framework I
propose, called contextual harmless error review, would put an end to that.273
269 Murray, supra note 16, at 1820 (arguing that “result-based harmless error review bears the
potential to systematically deprive redress for result-independent, non-truth-furthering interests in
cases where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming”).
270 See supra subsection II.B.1.
271 See supra note 14 (explaining the reason for this qualiﬁer).
272 See supra subsection II.B.2.
273 Some commentators would prefer to go further than this with respect to some prejudicebased constitutional rights—or all constitutional rights—by eliminating prejudice analysis at the
appellate and postconviction stages, thereby requiring automatic reversal irrespective of prejudice.
See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Strickland v. Washington: Gutting Gideon and Providing Cover for Incompetent
Counsel, in WE DISSENT 188, 200 (Michael Avery ed., 2009) (proposing automatic reversal for
ineﬀective assistance of counsel); David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be
Harmless?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 483, 483 (2000) (proposing automatic reversal for all constitutional
errors). Although there is much to be said in favor of automatic reversal, especially in connection
with ineﬀective assistance of counsel, I am reluctant to go down that road due to the risk of “remedial
deterrence,” see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 889 (1999) (arguing that “raising the ‘price’ of a constitutional violation by enhancing the
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A. Moving Prejudice from Rights to Remedies
The central ingredient of my proposal is to move prejudice from rights to
remedies. Speciﬁcally, I argue that courts should eliminate prejudice from the
deﬁnition of Brady, eﬀective assistance of counsel, and possibly other
outcome-centric prejudice-based rights, but permit consideration of
prejudice in connection with those rights in discrete remedial contexts.274
Courts may properly consider prejudice when a convicted defendant seeks
the remedy of reversal via appellate or postconviction review. Generally
speaking, however, prejudice should play a far more limited role when trial
judges, prosecutors, or police oﬃcers are applying those rights in the ﬁrst
instance, or when judges are asked to remedy rights violations before a
defendant has been convicted or sentenced.275
The selling point of this idea has to do with how it would impact the
administration of procedural law at the trial court level. As explained in Part
II, the deepest problems associated with outcome-centric, right-restricting
prejudice rules stem from the fact that they demand consideration of
prejudice not just in appellate and postconviction litigation, as is routine, but
also before trial court proceedings have culminated in a judgment.276
Relocating prejudice from rights to remedies would address those problems
at their root. For it would make clear that no one—neither trial judges, nor
prosecutors and police oﬃcers—may cite lack of prejudice as an excuse for
remedy” will “result in fewer violations” and a “par[ing] back [of] the constitutional right”), and for
other reasons I have discussed previously. See Murray, supra note 16, at 1806-10.
274 For purposes of this Section (but not Section III.B, below), I am assuming a ﬁxed deﬁnition
for prejudice—whatever deﬁnition the law currently supplies. See supra Section I.B (describing the
existing legal framework). So for Brady, prejudice means “a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.”
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.). Similarly, for the right
to eﬀective assistance of counsel, prejudice refers to “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
275 There are exceptional situations in which it would be appropriate, under the framework I
propose, to consider prejudice at the trial court level. But these exceptions prove the rule. Most
obviously, a trial judge would still be expected to assess prejudice, as under current law, when
disposing of new trial motions or other motions that, similar to an appeal, challenge a defendant’s
conviction or sentence after the fact. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 598, 601 (9th
Cir. 2005). A trial judge would take prejudice into account—though not necessarily under the same
doctrinal test as would apply in an appellate or postconviction proceeding—when deciding whether
a particular remedy is a proportionate response to a procedural error. To oﬀer an extreme example,
a trial judge ordinarily could not dismiss an indictment with prejudice as a sanction for
nonprejudicial errors. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-67 (1981).
276 See supra Section II.A. This is troubling because, to recap a bit, (1) prejudice to the outcome
can rarely be predicted with reliability ex ante, see supra subsection II.B.1, and (2) outcome-centric
prejudice analysis is insensitive to non-truth-furthering interests that criminal procedure ought to
protect, see supra subsection II.B.2.
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depriving defendants of their rights in the ﬁrst instance, or as a categorical
bar to providing ex ante relief for rights violations.
Regarding Brady, moving prejudice from rights to remedies would obligate
the government to disclose all evidence that favors the defense (absent a
protective order277), forbidding the suppression of favorable evidence that
prosecutors and police officers deem unlikely to affect the outcome.278 This
reform, moreover, would not only require the government to disclose more
evidence. It would also require the government to turn over all disclosable
evidence more expeditiously than current doctrine demands, as the timing of
disclosure would no longer be tied to prejudice (or more precisely,
materiality).279 And finally, modifying Brady along the lines suggested here
would also empower trial judges to enforce constitutional disclosure law
through pretrial discovery orders, in camera inspection of the government’s
evidence, and—if the government flouts its disclosure duties—sanctions.280
Regarding eﬀective assistance of counsel, my proposal would invigorate
structural reform litigation targeted at failing indigent defense systems.
Strickland’s prejudice requirement, conceptualized as a right-restricting rule,
has been a thorn in the side of prospective indigent defense litigation for
decades, for it has prompted courts to reject otherwise promising prospective
claims as either premature (since prospective claims by deﬁnition arise before
there is an outcome that could be prejudiced) or unduly speculative (since it
is hard to ﬁgure out, ex ante, what will aﬀect the outcome or not).281 Taking
prejudice out of the deﬁnition of the right to eﬀective assistance of counsel
would remove these obstacles.282
Moving prejudice from rights to remedies would not, however,
significantly alter how courts conduct prejudice analysis at the appellate and
postconviction stages. As noted earlier, reviewing courts operating within my
proposed framework would still evaluate prejudice—as a matter of remedial
law—before reversing a trial court judgment.283 Some scholars will likely see
See supra note 123.
See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. As discussed earlier, the conventional approach
to regulating when disclosure must take place under Brady—which is far too tolerant of prosecutorial
footdragging—derives from the materiality requirement. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 153–75 and accompanying text.
282 I do not mean to suggest that prospective indigent defense litigation would suddenly become
smooth sailing if prejudice were removed from the equation. Structural reform litigation in this
domain—as in other areas of law—can flop for a variety of reasons, some of which have little if anything
to do with prejudice doctrine. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. Yet some systemic Sixth
Amendment claims can and do succeed even under current law, see supra note 155 and accompanying
text, so it is worthwhile to think through how prejudice rules affect the viability of such claims.
283 See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text. That said, the ﬁrst part of my proposal would
not leave appellate and postconviction review wholly unchanged. One implication worth noting has
277
278
279
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this as a weakness of my proposal—the first part of the proposal, anyway. The
academic literature is sharply critical of Brady’s materiality requirement284 and
Strickland’s prejudice prong285 for setting an unreasonably high bar for reversal.
Recasting prejudice as a remedial issue would not address that concern.286
The concern is one I share, and would address—if I had my way—through
the second component of my proposal (discussed in the next Section), which
involves overhauling the existing doctrinal tests for prejudice.287 But to the
extent courts are not prepared to accept that part of the proposal, I am inclined
not to let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Recall that, at least with respect
to Brady and effective assistance of counsel, courts embraced outcome-centric,
right-restricting prejudice rules largely in order to shield the finality of criminal
judgments against perceivedly excessive appellate and postconviction
litigation.288 Any attempt to make defense-friendly adjustments to those rules
would arguably run counter to precedent289 while also inviting the familiar
objection that reversing a conviction or sentence is an inappropriate response to
errors that likely had no effect on the result.290 So from a strategic standpoint,
the main weakness of my first proposed reform—namely, that it does not
alleviate the heavy burden that Brady and Strickland impose on appellants and
postconviction petitioners—is simultaneously a source of strength. Even courts
that would reject out of hand the idea of lowering the threshold for appellate
to do with cumulative prejudice analysis. Although it is clear that courts should collectively evaluate
the materiality of multiple items of suppressed evidence under Brady, or the prejudice resulting
from multiple attorney mistakes under Strickland, courts are reluctant to aggregate prejudice when
faced with multiple claims that cut across these and other doctrinal boundaries—say, for example,
when a defendant asserts that Brady, Strickland, and other legal rules were each violated at the trial
court level. See Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1309, 1318-22 (2017). Why are courts skittish about cumulating prejudice in these situations?
Because no constitutional error occurs absent prejudice under the conventional interpretation of
Brady and Strickland, and “[m]eritless claims . . . cannot be cumulated, regardless of the total number
raised.” Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 726 (5th Cir. 1996). By establishing that error occurs
whenever the government suppresses favorable evidence or defense counsel furnishes deﬁcient
representation, my proposal would enable joint assessment of prejudice for all such errors—even if
each error, viewed in isolation, was not prejudicial.
284 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 12, at 711-15.
285 See generally William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 91 (1995).
286 Moreover, if courts were to embrace the ﬁrst component of my proposal (moving prejudice
from rights to remedies) without the second (redeﬁning prejudice), there is a danger that Brady’s
and Strickland’s prosecution-friendly test for prejudice, once it is ﬁrmly ensconced in the law of
remedies, might compete against and, in time, erode the (relatively) defense-friendly Chapman
harmless error rule. See supra note 28 (discussing Chapman). In my view, this risk—though real—is
a price worth paying to liberate rights as central to fairness as Brady and eﬀective assistance of
counsel from right-restricting prejudice rules and the problems they engender.
287 See infra Section III.B.
288 See supra Section I.C.
289 See supra subsections I.B.1–I.B.2.
290 See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1986).
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and postconviction relief might nevertheless be willing to confine Brady’s and
Strickland’s prejudice requirements to those remedial settings.
Indeed, many lower courts have already begun heading in this direction,
joined in some jurisdictions by legislatures and other rulemaking bodies.
With respect to Brady, some courts have held that due process obligates the
government to disclose evidence that favors the defense irrespective of
materiality, reasoning—to quote one federal district court opinion—that
materiality is “unknown and unknowable before trial begins” and thus is best
understood as “a standard articulated in the post-conviction context for
appellate review.”291 And other jurisdictions, though not requiring this as a
matter of constitutional law, have nevertheless done so through
nonconstitutional mechanisms such as statutes, court rules, and professional
ethics standards.292 With respect to eﬀective assistance of counsel, several
courts have concluded that Strickland’s prejudice prong is inapplicable to
prospective Sixth Amendment claims: “violations of the right to counsel can
occur in many diﬀerent ways,” according to a recent state supreme court
decision, and “[o]nly the remedy of a new trial requires a showing of
prejudice.”293 Some courts have reached the same conclusion as a matter of
state constitutional law,294 though not without simultaneously doing so based
on the Sixth Amendment.295 The time is ripe, it seems, to reshape Brady,
eﬀective assistance, and possibly other prejudice-based rights—whether
through constitutional reform or comparable nonconstitutional measures—
by moving prejudice from rights to remedies.

291 United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005); see also supra notes 121–26 and
accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text.
293 Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715, 743 (Pa. 2016); see also supra note 155 and
accompanying text.
294 See Stephen F. Hanlon, State Constitutional Challenges to Indigent Defense Systems, 75 MO. L.
REV. 751 (2010) (examining indigent defense litigation under state law, though without discussing
the role of prejudice).
295 See, e.g., Kuren, 146 A.3d at 732 n.6 (stating that the scope of the right to counsel under the
Pennsylvania Constitution is “coextensive” with that of the Sixth Amendment); see also Richard
Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineﬀective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1470-71 (1999)
(noting that while “[s]tate courts are free to interpret rights provided by their own state constitutions
(as the right to counsel invariably is) diﬀerently than the Supreme Court’s interpretations of federal
constitutional rights,” they “almost uniformly have adopted the Strickland standard” with the
exception of Hawaii).
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B. Redefining Prejudice
The second part of my proposal calls for redefining what prejudice means
for purposes of Brady, effective assistance of counsel, and potentially other
prejudice-based rights. Although there are many possible ways to go about this,
the approach I defend here would abandon the prevailing outcome-centric
conception of prejudice embedded in current doctrine, and replace it with a
non-outcome-centric framework that I call contextual harmless error review.296
This prescription grows out of a previous article in which I sketched a
“contextual approach to harmless error review” for use in connection with nonprejudice-based rights.297 In that piece, I criticized the dominant method of
harmless error review on the ground that it rests on a “monistic and resultbased conception of harm” that is “misaligned with the eclectic normative
objectives of criminal procedure.”298 The alternative I proposed, contextual
harmless error review, “involves two steps.”299 A court “would begin by
identifying the interest (or range of interests) protected by whichever
procedural rule was infringed.”300 It would then “examine whether the error
harmed the interests identified in the first step of the analysis to a degree
substantial enough to justify reversal.”301 Contextual harmless error review, I
296 One redeﬁnitional strategy that many scholars have embraced is to replace Brady’s
materiality requirement or Strickland’s prejudice prong with “traditional harmless error review,”
which is somewhat more defense-friendly (especially on direct appeal, and to a lesser extent in
postconviction review proceedings) than the Brady/Strickland standard. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke,
Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 518 (2009) (proposing this with respect to Brady);
Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Eﬀective Assistance of Counsel, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1, 41-49 (2009) (same, but with respect to Strickland); cf. supra note 28 (discussing the harmless error
doctrine as it relates to constitutional errors). While I certainly prefer what these scholars propose
over the doctrinal status quo, I doubt that switching from one outcome-centric prejudice rule to
another would substantially disrupt the way reviewing courts approach the task. I am persuaded that
a paradigm shift—a shift, that is, away from deﬁning prejudice in outcome-centric terms—is needed.
297 See Murray, supra note 16, at 1810-23.
298 Id. at 1813.
299 Id. at 1795.
300 Id. The relevant set of interests identiﬁed by the ﬁrst step of the analysis “will often change
from case to case for the simple reason that the normative priorities of criminal procedure likewise
vary a great deal from one rule to the next.” Id. at 1811; see also id. at 1795 (noting that criminal
procedure’s “ethical vision . . . encompasses a diverse array of ‘non-truth-furthering’ interests—
interests that include providing defendants with space for autonomous decisionmaking, enforcing
compliance with nondiscrimination norms, and making transparent the inner workings of criminal
justice—in addition to ‘truth-furthering’ objectives” (quoting, respectively, Stacy & Dayton, supra
note 100, at 94; Cover & Aleinikoﬀ, supra note 176, at 1092) (footnotes omitted)).
301 Id. at 1791. To illustrate how this two-step approach works, I applied it to a hypothetical
death penalty trial, loosely derived from an actual case, involving homophobic remarks made by a
prosecutor during the closing argument of the trial’s penalty phase. See id. at 1817-20. As to step one
of the analysis, identifying the relevant legally protected interests, I noted that the procedural rules
the prosecutor violated aim not only to prevent unfair outcomes resulting from biased
decisionmaking, but also to root out discrimination from the criminal process irrespective of a
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argued, would better equip appellate and postconviction courts to vindicate
“the full range of interests” that criminal procedure aspires to protect, not just
the narrower set of interests privileged by result-based harmless error review.302
My prior work, which examined how to improve harmless error review in
relation to non-prejudice-based rights, did not consider whether a similar
strategy should be employed in relation to prejudice-based rights like Brady
and effective assistance of counsel. I believe that it should. As explained in
Part II, governmental suppression of evidence and deficient representation by
defense counsel can both cause harm to an array of private and public
interests—such as autonomy, equal justice for rich and poor, transparency, and
separation of powers—even when the risk of prejudice to the outcome is slim
to none.303 The Brady/Strickland test for prejudice blinds courts to these forms
of harm by directing them to focus exclusively on whether evidence
suppression or deficient representation affected the outcome.304 Contextual
harmless error review would remedy that oversight, since it would “assess harm
in relation to the constellation of interests served by the particular procedural
rule that was infringed”—as relevant here, Brady or effective assistance of
counsel—“and would not, as under existing law, automatically confine the
[prejudice] inquiry to estimating the error’s effect on the outcome.”305
To better appreciate how contextual harmless error review would reshape
appellate and postconviction courts’ analysis of Brady and Strickland claims,
consider the following hypothetical. (Assume for purposes of the hypothetical
that my ﬁrst proposal—moving prejudice from rights to remedies—has
already been adopted by the relevant court.) An attempted robbery transpired
in broad daylight, and four witnesses, including the victim, each managed to
get a good look at the would-be robber.306 The police promptly responded to
the scene, and the three non-victim witnesses, who had no discernible motive
to lie, gave consistent, independent, and detailed descriptions of the
perpetrator.307 Their descriptions matched the defendant, whom the police
particular defendant’s culpability. Id. at 1817-18. Regarding step two, balancing, I concluded that “the
prosecutor’s bigoted remarks . . . harmed [antidiscrimination] interests to a degree that warrants
reversal of [the defendant’s] death sentences”—even assuming that “the prosecution’s case
supporting a death sentence was so overwhelming that the jury assuredly would have rendered the
same verdict absent the error.” Id. at 1818-19.
302 Id. at 1795.
303 See supra subsection II.B.2.
304 See id.
305 Murray, supra note 16, at 1791.
306 The perpetrator reportedly grabbed the victim by the shirt and ordered him to empty his
pockets. But the victim had left his wallet and phone at home that day, so he did not have anything in
his pockets. Once the perpetrator realized this, he took off running with nothing to show for his efforts.
307 They each described the perpetrator as a teenage black male of roughly average weight and
height with a light complexion who was wearing a short-sleeve shirt with the local baseball team’s
logo, denim jeans, a belt, and brown shoes.
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stopped just a few blocks away minutes after the incident. By contrast, the
victim’s initial description of the perpetrator conﬂicted in some respects with
the description furnished by the non-victim witnesses.308 But the victim’s
description evolved a bit in his second police report the following day,
bringing his version into agreement with the description supplied by the
other witnesses.309 All four witnesses identiﬁed the defendant in a showup
identiﬁcation procedure. The government never disclosed the victim’s ﬁrst
police report to the defense, thereby violating Brady, to the extent the Brady
right is not limited by prejudice, as we are currently assuming.310 The
defendant went to trial, though his lawyer put on no defense beyond
generically relying on the government’s burden to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The jury found the defendant guilty.
After losing his direct appeal, the defendant sought postconviction relief
in state court on two grounds. First, he claimed that his conviction should be
overturned under Brady due to the government’s suppression of the victim’s
initial description—which had fortuitously been uncovered through post-trial
news reporting about his case. Second, he alleged that state-appointed trial
counsel was ineﬀective insofar as counsel disregarded his expressed desire to
testify311 and did not even bother interviewing the defendant or his mother
to investigate a potential alibi defense.312 Following an evidentiary hearing,
308 During his ﬁrst interview with the police, the victim reported that the perpetrator was
wearing a long-sleeve shirt with the baseball team’s logo—as opposed to a short-sleeve shirt—and
that he did not appear to have on a belt. Otherwise, the victim’s description aligned with that of the
non-victim witnesses.
309 The victim also gave the police an explanation for his shifting recollection of the
perpetrator’s physical proﬁle. He explained that in the immediate aftermath of the incident, he had
been unable to think straight or accurately recall what the perpetrator looked like due to the stress
he was going through; but once he had a chance to cool down and reﬂect, his memory improved,
enabling him to report that the perpetrator’s shirt had short sleeves and that he was wearing a belt.
One cannot help but wonder, though, whether the victim’s independent recollection of the
perpetrator’s appearance had been tainted when he saw the defendant wearing short sleeves and a
belt during the police identiﬁcation procedure.
310 In light of our present assumption that prejudice has been removed from the deﬁnition of
the Brady right, violations occur whenever the government suppresses evidence that is even
minimally favorable to the defense. The victim’s initial description undoubtedly satisﬁes that test,
since it provides (1) aﬃrmative evidence of innocence, albeit weak evidence, because the description
did not match the defendant in some respects, and (2) impeachment evidence insofar as it
contradicts the victim’s second police report and the descriptions reported by the other witnesses.
311 Cf. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018) (“The choice is not all or nothing: To
gain assistance, a defendant need not surrender control entirely to counsel. . . . Some
decisions . . . are reserved for the client—notably, whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury
trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal.” (emphasis added)). But see id. at 1510-11 (“Because
a client’s autonomy, not counsel’s competence, is in issue, we do not apply our ineﬀective-assistanceof-counsel jurisprudence . . . to McCoy’s claim.”).
312 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (ﬁnding that counsel’s penalty phase
investigation was deﬁcient where “incomplete investigation was the result of inattention, not
reasoned strategic judgment”).
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the postconviction court credited the defendant’s allegation (corroborated by
trial counsel) that counsel had kept him oﬀ the stand contrary to his wishes
and had failed to look into his alibi. Yet the court concluded that even with
the Brady evidence suppressed by the government and the testimony the
defendant and his mother might have oﬀered at trial, there was no realistic
chance that the jury would have returned a diﬀerent verdict.313 The
government’s evidence of guilt was far too strong, the court determined, and
the defendant’s alibi too convoluted for the new information to plausibly
aﬀect the outcome.314
Under current law—indeed, even current law as modiﬁed by the ﬁrst part
of my proposal (moving rights to remedies)—the postconviction court’s
ﬁndings would doom the defendant’s request for a postconviction remedy. To
establish prejudice in the context of a petition for postconviction relief, Brady
and Strickland both require the defendant to show a “reasonable probability”
that the outcome would have been diﬀerent had the alleged error not
occurred.315 The strength of the government’s proof, coupled with the
fragility of the defendant’s alibi, would make the defendant unable to satisfy
this outcome-centric standard.
If, by contrast, the postconviction court were to apply contextual harmless
error review in lieu of the conventional “reasonable probability” test for
prejudice, the defendant’s prospects for securing relief would grow far
brighter. That is because the court would then have to consider not just
whether the outcome was aﬀected, but also whether the Brady violation or
ineﬀective assistance of counsel substantially harmed—to a degree warranting
a new trial—any other interests that the Constitution’s discovery and counsel

313 Our hypothetical judge is apparently in good company. Two scholars who examined case
law on the constitutional right to testify in 2013 determined that Strickland’s prejudice prong had
“rendered [the right] a nullity” since “the defendant loses almost every time.” Daniel J. Capra &
Joseph Tartakovsky, Why Strickland Is the Wrong Test for Violations of the Right to Testify, 70 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 95, 112-13 (2013); see also id. at 113-14 (“The court usually ﬁnds some or all of the
following: the accused would not have been found credible; his testimony would have been
cumulative; he would have been exposed to impeachment with prior convictions; the
evidence against him was ‘overwhelming’; or his testimony was weak and would not have helped.”
(footnotes omitted)).
314 As proﬀered at the evidentiary hearing, the defendant would have testiﬁed at trial that
around the time of the incident he had been visiting a group of friends who often hung out in the
area and that, when the police stopped him (unaccompanied by any friends) minutes after the
incident, he had ﬁnished the visit and was heading home. The defendant’s mother would have
testiﬁed that, hours before this, the defendant had said he was going out for a while to see his pals.
Neither the defendant nor his mother, however, could supply real names (as opposed to aliases) or
addresses for any of the purported friends, and the defendant did not call any of them to testify at
the evidentiary hearing.
315 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see generally supra subsections I.B.1–I.B.2.

2020]

Prejudice-Based Rights

327

safeguards are supposed to advance.316 Here, the defendant could forcefully
argue that the errors in his case gravely impaired a legally protected autonomy
interest by silencing him at trial and depriving him of the opportunity to
articulate any defense theory beyond abstract platitudes about the
government’s burden of proof.317 In my judgment, that harm would likely
justify relief—if, at least, the defendant was diligent in seeking postconviction
review in a timely fashion after discovering the factual basis for his claims,
maximizing the odds that the government could relocate its witnesses and
potentially retry him.318
I recognize that some observers might reach a conclusion diﬀerent from
my own on these facts by assigning less weight to the defendant’s autonomy
interest or heavier weight to the social cost of a new trial. For doctrinal tests
that endeavor to strike a delicate balance among competing interests, as does
contextual harmless error review, good-faith disagreements inevitably come
with the territory.319 We should not be alarmed by this. Whatever the true
value of autonomy might be in the hypothetical I have constructed, or in real
cases that are similar to it, the answer surely is not zero—not by a longshot.
Yet zero is precisely the value that the outcome-centric prejudice paradigm
ascribes to autonomy and criminal procedure’s other non-truth-furthering
interests, insofar as it excludes them entirely from the governing remedial
framework. So while contextual harmless error review would not produce
clear and uncontroversial answers in close cases, it would at least equip courts
to ask the right questions.

See supra notes 297–305 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 233–36, 247–49 and accompanying text (suggesting that Brady and the right
to eﬀective assistance of counsel should be understood as advancing autonomy as well as reliability).
318 Cf. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 443 (1995) (stating that, although the government
has a “legitimate and important” interest in avoiding retrial for individuals whose convictions were
in fact unaﬀected by errors, this interest “is somewhat diminished . . . if one assumes . . . that retrial
will often (or even sometimes) lead to reconviction”). Most modern schemes for postconviction
review have a distinct set of rules—separate from the harmless error doctrine—that regulate when
claims must be ﬁled. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2018) (erecting a one-year statute of limitations
with varying triggers to start the clock).
319 See Epps, supra note 13, at 2158 (criticizing my proposed contextual approach to harmless
error review as “indeterminate” because “[t]here is without doubt signiﬁcant disagreement—both
within the judiciary and without—about the social costs of reversal and the value of particular
constitutional rights”). Relatedly, Brandon Garrett has suggested that contextual harmless error
review might make appellate and postconviction remedial decisionmaking even more erratic than it
currently is by “liberat[ing] judges to further rely on their own value judgments.” Brandon Garrett,
Patterns of Error, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 287, 288 (2017).
316
317
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CONCLUSION
There is an understandable impulse, for many scholars and judges who
study constitutional doctrine, to conﬂate the categories of right and remedy,
treating any expansion or contraction in one domain as tantamount to
expansion or contraction of the other. With regard to this Article’s core topic,
prejudice-based rights, commentators often suggest that there is little or no
meaningful diﬀerence between folding prejudice into the deﬁnition of a right
versus employing prejudice to limit access to appellate or postconviction
remedies for violations of the right.320 In numerous other doctrinal
contexts—ranging from the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and
qualiﬁed immunity to habeas and Bivens—critics charge that courts have
profoundly yet surreptitiously diminished the scope of constitutional rights
under the guise of adjusting remedial law.321 And as a matter of constitutional
theory, Daryl Levinson and other scholars of a pragmatist bent322 have argued
that “the cash value of any right is a function of the remedial consequences
attached to its violation”323 and thus that there is no real point in trying to
“sharply separat[e] the realm of rights from the realm of remedies.”324
This Article suggests, however, that in at least some areas of the law, there
are compelling reasons—pragmatic reasons—to reinforce, not dissolve, the
conceptual boundary between rights and remedies. As I have shown, remedyrestricting prejudice rules in constitutional criminal procedure pose fewer
risks to the vitality of rights than do right-restricting prejudice rules since the
former, unlike the latter, enable courts to ration the availability of certain
remedies while leaving other mechanisms for implementing rights—
alternative judicial remedies as well as eﬀorts by nonjudicial actors—intact.
This insight yields a simple yet powerful doctrinal prescription for some of
criminal procedure’s most important rights, such as Brady and eﬀective
assistance of counsel: take prejudice out of the deﬁnition of these rights, and
recast it as a remedial question entrusted primarily to appellate and

See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
A recent article by Leah Litman develops an especially forceful variant of this argument
that emphasizes the collective impact of remedial backsliding in all of these domains on the de facto
scope of constitutional rights. See Leah Litman, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 1477, 1500 (2018) (“When almost every adjudication of a right is refracted through the same,
demanding remedial standard, the remedial system eﬀectively narrows the contours of the
underlying rights themselves.”).
322 Pragmatist constitutional theory comes in many ﬂavors. The sort of pragmatism I am
referencing here posits that “remedies deﬁne . . . right[s],” thereby “equating rights exclusively with
the rights that courts will enforce[] . . . .” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1315 (2006).
323 Levinson, supra note 273 at 874.
324 Id. at 857.
320
321
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postconviction courts, in order to strengthen constitutional implementation
at the trial court level.
But this Article also carries a broader lesson for constitutional theory, in
addition to its more immediate implications for criminal procedure reform.
The lesson, succinctly stated, is that constitutional rights are not reducible to
judicial remedies, and certainly not to any single remedy (such as appellate
reversal). It can matter a great deal whether courts, when responding to
concerns tied to particular remedies (such as the cost of awarding new trials),
choose to restrict those remedies or, instead, to reshape the underlying right.
Pragmatist constitutional theory downplays this practically impactful choice
at its peril.

